The Fate of China’s Global Supply Chains in the New Tariff Era
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Hello, and welcome to a second edition this week of the China Global South podcast, a proud member of the Sinica podcast network. I’m Eric Olander. Unfortunately, Giraud and Kobus, well, not unfortunately for them, they’re off at a conference in Nairobi this week, and they won’t be able to join us for today’s discussion. But we’re going to have them back on Friday in our Africa show, and there’s been a lot going on in the China-Africa space, so make sure you check that out.
But today we’re going to drop a second China Global South podcast in your feed just because of the magnitude of everything that’s been going on around the world with the markets, especially out here in Asia. Certainly, watching Wall Street overnight was a heart-wrenching thing where it was up and it was down and rumors and everything about what’s going on. Today we’re going to talk about tariffs and supply chains.
Now, Donald Trump has threatened China with an extra 50% tariff on goods imported to the U.S. if China does not withdraw its 34% counter-tariff that it put on. We are in, there’s no doubt about it, a world trade war, as we talked about yesterday in our discussion with Princeton University’s Kyle Chan. These counter-tariffs and tariff actions are the latest of that.
Now, that means U.S. companies could face a total rate of 104% on Chinese imports as the new 50% threat that Trump issued this week comes on top of the 20% tariffs that he put on in March and then the 34% tariffs that went on last week. Following all that, 104% could potentially bring U.S.-China trade to a halt. Last year, U.S.-China trade exceeded $525 billion, so the scale and scope of this is absolutely enormous.
Now, unlike other countries that are accommodating the United States, Beijing is having none of it and said on Tuesday that it would fight until the end. The U.S. abuse of tariffs seriously infringes upon the legitimate rights and interests of countries, violates WTO rules, hurts the rules-based multilateral trading system, and destabilizes the global economic order. It is a typical move of unilateralism, protectionism, and economic bullying. It is rejected by the whole international community. China strongly deplores and firmly opposes this.
Let me stress once again that trade wars and tariff wars have no winners, and protectionism has no way out. The Chinese people never create trouble, nor do we fear trouble. Pressuring, threatening, or extorting China is not the right way to engage with us. China will do what is necessary to firmly safeguard our legitimate and lawful rights and interests. If the U.S. insists on waging the tariffs war and trade war, regardless of the interests of both countries and the international community, China will play along to the end.
That reference to basically fighting until the end is what caught the headlines out here in Asia and really sent a chill through the markets. Investors were also shaken this week when White House trade advisor Peter Navarro told CNBC that Vietnam’s offer to eliminate tariffs on U.S. imports wouldn’t matter. And just remember, that’s a big deal because Vietnam has the third largest trade surplus with the United States at $123 billion, and the Southeast Asian country is now squarely in the crosshairs of the Trump administration.
But hopes were raised last week when Communist Party General Secretary Toh Lam got into a phone conversation with Donald Trump, which really sent a vibe that maybe a deal could be struck if the Vietnamese buy more Boeing planes, they’re going to build some Trump golf courses, they’re going to buy more natural gas, and they’re going to allow Elon Musk’s Starlink internet service to come into the country. There was a little bit of optimism that that would potentially settle it.
And remember, the White House has been saying that they want to do deals, but all of that got shaken on Monday when Navarro made it clear on CNBC that that won’t cut it because the White House is angry about the offshoring of Chinese supply chains to Vietnam in a phenomenon called transshipments, where Chinese parts and products are made in China, shipped to Vietnam, assembled in Vietnam as products that are then exported to the United States, effectively circumventing these tariffs.
Let’s take a listen now to the thinking at the White House from Peter Navarro. What we have here is a national emergency based on massive chronic trade deficits caused by systematically higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers. So when you ask if we’re willing to negotiate, the president will always listen. But let’s understand what the problem is. When you have a country like Vietnam, let’s take Vietnam. When they come to us and say, we’ll go to zero tariffs, that means nothing to us because it’s the non-tariff cheating that matters.
Let’s do Vietnam, Joe. They sell us $15 for every $1 we sell them. About $5 of that $15 is China transshipping to Vietnam to evade their tariffs. What does Vietnam do? They dump into our markets, killing our shrimpers, our people who make metal brackets, kitchen cabinets, agricultural products. They engage in intellectual property theft. They have the biggest number of cases aside from China at the Department of Commerce on dumping.
So the point is, anybody who wants to come to talk to us, talk to us about lowering your non-tariff barriers. Vietnam has a 10% VAT. Europe has a 19% VAT. We can’t compete against that. I think the VAT issue is something that’s the value-added tax was a little confusing to a lot of people because that’s often a domestic tax charged to consumers within those countries and not necessarily related to trade.
So a lot of people were confused about that. But listening to Navarro, trade policy folks in Cambodia, in Mexico, in Brazil, and around the global south, their stomachs probably sank on this, in part because there’s been a 10 to 15-year trend of China moving big parts of its supply chains offshore. If the United States is interpreting that as transshipment and potentially a barrier to reaching some kind of tariff goal, it is going to be very difficult to reach deals to remove these tariffs and to get past where we are today.
That’s why I am thrilled to be able to have on the show three experts on this very topic to help us understand what’s happening and look at Chinese supply chains and how they may be impacted by all of these events that are going on. The folks at the Rhodium Group, they are one of the top China consultancy and advisories in the world, based in Washington, but also have offices in New York and Paris.
They issued a report back in February called China and the Future of Global Supply Chains. Of course, this was written in February, long before Donald Trump’s Liberation Day in April. But it does give us some very fascinating insights into the trends. It was written by Agatha Kratz, who’s a partner at Rhodium Group, leading the firm’s corporate advisory work. She’s been on our show many times before.
Juliana Bouchot, who’s a senior analyst with Rhodium’s corporate advisory team, also with Agatha in Paris. And Lauren Piper, who’s doing graduate work at Princeton University but previously worked on the Rhodium corporate advisory team as well. Thank you all for joining us today, and the timing of our discussion couldn’t be better aligned with your report as well.
So, Agatha, Julia, Lauren, great to have you on the show. Thank you for having us, Eric. Agatha, let’s start with you just as the leader of the team here. When you hear Peter Navarro and you see the events that have unfolded since you published the report in February, and you hear this talk about the frustration that the White House has with transshipments, let’s just get your reaction as a segue into the details of your report.
So, I think one of the reasons that drove us to write this report, it’s available on the website for everyone to see, is the kind of constant mention of Vietnam as a transshipment hub. We wanted to go deeper into this, as we usually do at the Rhodium Group, to see if the data supported some of these claims. We went in, and what we wanted to see was whether it was transshipment, whether it was final assembly, which could also be a problem. If you’re relying mostly on cheap, subsidized Chinese inputs, just merely putting them together in Vietnam, then selling them off into the U.S., it might also be a problem.
Or if you actually had deeper supply chains forming on the ground in Vietnam, but also Malaysia, Thailand, and all kinds of places around the world, especially ASEAN, which is one of the findings of the report. What we found was two parallel and equally valid truths. One, which is that China remains an absolute dominant manufacturing power globally, and has actually increased its share of manufacturing export in a wide range of sectors. We looked at just four of those: textile, electronics, cars, and solar PV. China is mostly increasing its share of global manufacturing there.
But at the same time, you also have emerging manufacturing hubs in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam, but again, not just. Those are, of course, doing some level of transshipment. I mean, there’s no question that there’s some level of activity that’s pretty much going to a Vietnamese port, relabeling, and then going off to the U.S. But we’re also seeing final assembly and a whole lot of it from Chinese companies and not just, and a whole lot of suppliers following those assemblers into the country.
So we now have, finally, six, seven, eight years after the first trade war, we now finally have deep supply chains that are establishing in ASEAN in a way that should make people like Peter Navarro feel better about what’s happening in Vietnam. The problem is what happened last week is just interrupting this in the most violent way. It’s going to just break the cycle in a terrible way if it continues.
Juliana, if you had the chance to speak with Peter Navarro to explain to him what Agatha was explaining here about the nature of Chinese supply chains in Vietnam, what would you tell him? Oh, gosh, what a question. Well, I think one of the realizations we’ve come to in this report is there are two really meaningful axes to look at the speed at which diversification is going to happen. One is policy and the intensity of de-risking policies, and the other is the extent to which China has comparative manufacturing advantage, a comparative advantage in efficiency, cost advantage, etc.
And, of course, the extent to which other production hubs can emerge as reliable candidates to pick up China’s manufacturing share is crucial here. These policies, which implement sort of across-the-board tariffs on all countries, including alt-China diversification partners, are in some ways going to lead maybe to more of a freeze in supply chains and lead perhaps more to increasing inflation rather than meaningfully restructuring supply chains in the short term.
Yeah, so the way that they’re going about it is so violent, as Agatha said, that it’s actually going to push costs up and potentially spark inflation, not only in the United States but elsewhere as well. Lauren, one of the interesting things about the way you guys did this report is that you’re both backwards-looking and forward-looking. So you look back 10 years, but then also through 2030.
I guess I’d like to hear from you on both sides of this. On the one hand, you made it very clear in the report that the trend of diversifying Chinese supply chains was well underway before what we’ve seen this year, before the second Trump administration. On the other hand, as you look to 2030, I’m wondering how many of your assumptions may have been disrupted by the violence of, again, what Agatha was saying, the violence of the Trump policy that’s been so disruptive. How many of your forward-looking projections do you think are holding up?
I think looking at the report, as Agatha mentioned, the key takeaway is that China is still incredibly dominant across different supply chains. We looked at apparel, we looked at electronics, and so on. Let’s take apparel as an example here. This is a sector that for a long time has been a way for less advanced economies to become part of global value chains. In fact, it’s how China became a global manufacturing power through the rise of made-in-China apparel starting around the 2000s.
We’ve seen a little bit of diversification. So, a handful of alternative production hubs like Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and so on have emerged. But again, China is still a major player. It accounted for over 30% of global exports in 2023, and it’s still a top producer of some of the inputs, such as buttons, even the fabric, and so on.
Thinking about what happens next, the most important factor is going to be where the tariff levels end up. Right now, Trump has called for tariffs even on these other production hubs like Vietnam, like Bangladesh, like Cambodia, which are going to significantly increase the cost of doing business. While we’ve seen diversification happen quite a bit, if there is not much of a difference in tariff levels between China and these alternative production hubs, there’s a relatively high chance that these supply chains are going to remain in China. This is because China has such a productive and efficient environment.
We’ve seen that even as labor costs rise in China, the value of having these optimized supply chains can really reduce costs for suppliers. For example, we read about a company in China that makes jeans, and they have been in Cambodia for the past 20 years. But as labor costs rise there, they’re actually thinking about moving back to China because the factories tend to be more efficient.
It’s easier to do business there, and the labor cost difference is just not that high. So looking ahead, if we see that there’s not much of a difference between the tariff levels imposed on China versus these alternative manufacturing hubs, it’s possible that some of these supply chains may not shift that much, particularly in sectors where reshoring is not really viable. Let’s stick with the apparel because that’s one of the more interesting sectors of the four that you looked at, in part because, again, China’s profile in this is changing a lot. You said that in the report, the shift has been underway for the past 15 years, moving out to places like Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, and whatnot. That logic may not make as much sense when there are 46 percent tariffs on Vietnamese goods. As you pointed out, the same thing goes for jeans in Cambodia, where they’re facing a 50 percent tariff, even higher. News came out this week as well that the United States has gone back on its policy to tariff products under $800 coming in directly from China, which is going to impact Xi’an and Timu, which is the huge e-commerce. So this idea of buying 15 dresses on Xi’an and then returning 14; that all is going to go away now that those are going to be heavily tariffed.
Lauren, let’s just quickly wrap up with you on apparel. This impact is going to severely disrupt daily life in the United States that has become accustomed to being able to go online or use your thumb on a phone to purchase Xi’an goods and to go into Walmart and buy Nike shoes for $60, $70. That’s no longer going to be the case. I mean, are we really going to look at an experiment of what it’s like in the United States to be without low-cost Chinese products? I think you’re absolutely right.
I’m incredibly interested to watch what happens with these Chinese companies like Xi’an and Timu that, to date, have not really had to pay any tariffs. I think that what will be really interesting is that these companies are going to potentially move from facing zero tariffs to maybe 100, 120 percent. And there’s not going to be, again, any room for them to hide. Some of these companies have to date tried to diversify their supply chains. So Xi’an and Timu have reportedly looked at Brazil, Turkey, and Mexico.
Even in February, Xi’an was asking some of its top suppliers to expand production in places like Vietnam. But by and large, they are mostly producing in China because this is where they can have this network of small suppliers that can trial out small batch orders of new trendy clothes. That makes it possible to order the 15 dresses and return 14 of them. They are also apparently facing pressure from the Ministry of Commerce to keep manufacturing in China.
So again, the final costs of these products for U.S. consumers are going to depend highly on where these tariff rates come out because if there are tariffs imposed broadly on these alternative suppliers—not just China, but on Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, and so on—it’s going to make it incredibly difficult to reduce costs.
Agatha, when we hear everything that Lauren’s laid out in terms of the apparel sector, a lot of this applies to some of the other sectors that you looked at. Let’s look at consumer electronics. How do we adapt to this type of world that we’re in when we can’t see past next week? Before we get into consumer electronics, can you just give us a few insights into some of the conversations that you’re having with your clients now about some of their concerns and how they are responding to some of these dramatic changes?
Yeah, of course. I think you need to break it down short-term, medium-term, long-term. That’s the only way that you can kind of make sense of what’s happening, right? Short-term, I think you’re going to have a lot of wait-and-see attitudes. You’re going to have people, investors, traders, and shippers who are just going to wait out and see what happens.
What happens between the U.S. and China? What happens between the U.S. and the EU? What happens in the first few negotiations? I mean, if I were a company today, I would wait for a month or two to see what happens with India, for example, in that discussion, whether, because India, in our opinion at least, is probably one of the emerging markets that are closest to potentially striking a deal with the Trump administration.
There was a great summit in Washington between Modi and Trump. There was a great discussion about having a trade agreement. India said he was very willing to think about tariff dropping and potentially other kinds of purchases and everything. So I would wait for a while and see what happens. First, to see where negotiations go. Second, to see how much harm gets shed across the whole of the U.S. economy, global, of course, but U.S. first and foremost.
Wait to see inflation numbers coming out. Wait to see trade numbers coming out. Wait to see employment numbers coming out. Wait to see markets move back and forth on the back of announcements. And then see where things land. At this stage, I mean, the shock that the Trump administration created to the system last week is so big that something’s going to have to give at some point, and something’s going to have to change. This is highly, highly and absolutely unsustainable.
And so the question is, how does it change? Does it change on a kind of sector basis and product basis? Does it change on a country basis? So a sector basis would be to say, you know what? Consumer electronics and textiles, I’m never going to make those in the U.S. Just let them flow in, wherever they come from, whatever, let them come in.
They’re such a huge part of the consumer basket, and they’re now taxed at about 40%. I mean, for textiles, it’s incredible. Just let them come in duty-free, or somewhere around duty-free, or maybe 10% so that you can collect a bit of revenue on them. Or country-wise, right? Does India get a deal, and then Japan get a deal, and then a few more? And then as a company, you’re going to start looking at this and then look at whether there’s also just a broad-based delay of the tariff.
We could absolutely imagine that between now and tonight because sometimes these things happen. You have a delay of a month, you have a delay of two months, you have a delay of even three days. That’s, of course, what the market got all excited about in New York on Tuesday when there was a false rumor of a 90-day delay.
Yeah, and so wait and see. That’s the first phase. The second phase, medium-term, is then to say, okay, what are the signals I get and what do they tell me about? Who’s having the most influence in the Trump cabinet? What is the mix of what the Trump administration wants to do? Do they want to raise revenues? Do they want to reshape supply chains so that they move back to America? Or do they just want to strike deals? And how does that compare with the economic constraints of this, right?
In the medium run, you’re going to have a little bit more clarity, if not certainty, because we’re never going to be in a certain world in the next four years, right? But a little bit more clarity about what are the key drivers of the policy and what are some of the repeat games that are being played.
And then long-term, you’re going to have to look for countries that have the biggest differential with the highest kind of tax country. So 10% countries we’re going to look at very closely. There’s a lot of opportunity out there for global sales countries. Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco are in a great position at 10%. It looks bad, but sincerely, like 10% compared to 47 for Vietnam versus 60, I mean, 65 to now 120, on China if you add also the Biden and Trump 1.0 tariffs. You’re going to be fine.
The only thing is, as a country, you’re going to need to manage transshipment because the U.S. administration is not going to like that. Chinese input or value-add being used too much will not be liked either, etc. So there’s still going to be an action-reaction cycle. The Trump administration is going to be watching for illegal behaviors and transshipment and Chinese value-add being used because they don’t like this. But I think it’s a long game at this stage.
First is just watch and wait and watch what’s happening. I’m glad you brought up this question of winners and losers. One of the issues that we’ve been following is that countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are going to become very big winners potentially as China shifts out of U.S. agriculture to buy from other providers. And even Europe may benefit from that as well.
Funny you talked about U.S. apparel. One of the videos that we’re circulating on social media today, on Chinese social media, on WeChat, was an AI-generated video of overweight and obese Americans sitting behind sewing machines making T-shirts. Again, it’s odd because this is not a type of job that Americans really want because it is tough, it is brutal, it is low cost.
As long as Americans want to get 299 T-shirts at Walmart, you’re not going to make a 299 T-shirt spending $35 an hour with union benefits. Those are incongruous with one another. Juliana, let’s go down our list now to consumer electronics. You mentioned in the report that of the four sectors, consumer electronics is different than the others because the Chinese share of that supply chain is the highest.
Talk to us a little bit about why consumer electronics, phones, and computers are different. Also, the fact that I recently bought a new Apple computer that shipped directly from Guangzhou to me in the United States. Those days may be gone as well if the tariffs are what they are. Talk to us about consumer electronics.
Eric, can I jump in here? Yeah. Just because Lauren actually did all of the research on electronics. Great. Well, then let’s go down to Lauren. Okay. I’ll come back to you, Juliana. Lauren, you are up now on consumer electronics. The takeaway from consumer electronics is that China is just incredibly dominant in this sector.
You know, historically, electronics has been a sector with these very complex, globally integrated supply chains. Take your smartphone or your laptop that you bought. Typically, it was going to have a chip that was maybe designed in the U.S., manufactured in Taiwan using equipment from the Netherlands. This chip is then going to get shipped to China or Vietnam or India, and it’s going to be assembled alongside components from South Korea, from Germany, and also from China.
So electronics is a sector with these very complex, globally integrated supply chains. And historically, these supply chains have shifted based on differences in production skills and costs. The expectation really was that over time, China, too, would offshore some of the final assembly as it moved up the value chain. But as I mentioned earlier, as we’ve seen in other industries, China really puts this dynamic into question.
For the past 15 years, it has exported more electronics than all other countries combined. That’s 65 percent of laptop and tablet exports and around half of smartphone exports by value. One last thing to note here is that it’s not just the finished products; it’s also the components.
Even when we see some supply chains of the final assembly moving to places like Vietnam and India, particularly for Samsung and Apple, these supply chains are still highly reliant on machinery, components, and even sometimes engineers that are coming from China. With regard to the U.S. tariffs, I think the positive news for electronics is that there is some existing manufacturing capacity outside of China, despite China’s overwhelming preeminence in this sector.
For example, Apple has significant capabilities in India and in Vietnam. These companies will be able to use some of this manufacturing capacity to shift production and some of the trade flows to the United States. There was a report that came out yesterday suggesting that Apple is going to take basically everything it makes in India and ship it to the U.S. market.
But because China is still such a key player throughout the electronic supply chain, there’s no way for these manufacturing sites outside of China to fully meet U.S. demand. I think the report said that if Apple shifts all of its production in India and puts it to the United States, it will only meet around 50 percent of current U.S. demand.
So the implication here for the U.S. is that there’s just nowhere to hide from these tariffs and U.S. consumers are going to feel it. I mean, Apple has been the focus of the Trump administration because of its iconic brand. What you’re hearing from analysts, though, is that it would be impossible. I mean, it’s not possible at all to move the Apple supply chain to the United States, even if it wanted to.
Tim Cook, who is a supply chain expert himself, who came through the Apple ranks on the supply chain side, said that one of the biggest issues facing them is the fact that in China, there’s an entire population of supply chain engineers who have decades of experience, and he can’t find those people in the United States.
But as you talked about, Lauren, too, that it’s not just the iPhone; it’s the five or six hundred companies that feed into the iPhone with the supply chain. On top of that, anybody who spent time in southern China around Dongguan or in Guangdong province will know that the infrastructure that the Chinese have built to bring the stuff in and ship the stuff out is not even comparable to what we have in the United States.
When you look at the ports of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Shanghai compared to the ports of Long Beach and Oakland, they couldn’t handle a fraction of the load of what these Chinese ports are handling in terms of the volume. Remember that Apple has to produce something like 50 to 60 million iPhones on the launch of a new iPhone product. They have to scale that up in the space of about two to three weeks when design is locked and shipment has to start.
Lauren, let’s just call it what it is. Is it even possible to do what Trump wants to do and move the Apple supply chain to the United States based on what you guys found in your research? I think that it would be incredibly difficult. Take Apple as an example. After President Trump imposed tariffs in his first term on China, the company started looking to Vietnam and India as alternative production hubs.
They’ve invested significantly in this effort, as you mentioned, not just to bring the final assembly but also to encourage their component suppliers and other companies to co-locate with them. Apple started this process back in President Trump’s first term, but they are still heavily reliant on China, and they’re having to manage the costs associated with moving elsewhere because compared to China, really no country can replicate the scale and the production efficiencies it has.
So the short answer is that no, in the near term, there’s a very low chance of the U.S. actually reshoring these ports and manufacturing activities. Eric, let me just add something here, which is to say, you know, there is a rational and efficient way to try and do this, right? Even if you wanted to do this, even if you wanted to do this more than anything else—if you wanted to bring back electronics and that was your absolute favorite industry and you wanted it in the U.S.—there would be pathways.
You would have to say, we’ll do tariffs, but we’ll do tariffs over time. We’ll do them over 10 years. We’re going to let Vietnam sell us things in the meantime. And we’re going to let Vietnam use a little bit of Chinese things in the meantime. And over time, we’re going to increase tariffs on Vietnam if they continue using Chinese inputs. But we’re going to do that over a long period, a stretched period of time. So that’s the first thing. You give companies time and then you need to give companies certainty. And this is where we have a problem here because everything with the tariffs at the moment just makes it completely impossible for any company to make an investment because they don’t know what will happen next week, next month, next year.
And so if you had both of those things, then you could actually get something moving. And as a matter of fact, if there’s one thing that was incredibly surprising and kind of heartwarming in the report, it was also the fact that the U.S. picked up manufacturing supply chain cloud over the past five years. It’s the only, absolute only advanced economy that managed to reclaim global export and global supply chain and manufacturing kind of production globally.
Why? Because they had a piecemeal approach under Biden that said, “OK, over the next four or five years, this is what we wish the world to look like. This is what we wish our supply chains for clean technologies to look like. We want to reassure them. This is what it’s going to take. We’re going to give you X years to get your supply chain China free. We’re going to give you X years to invest in the country and start selling. And we’re going to give you the certainty that you’re going to get subsidies. Especially consumers are going to get subsidies if they buy your product made in America.”
And all of this, in a way, means it is doable. It’s hard. It’s painful. It’s expensive. It takes time. But you want to reassure an industry; you probably can do it. I mean, you don’t want to do it for everything. You probably don’t want to do it for textiles. And by the way, you probably don’t want to do it for phones. But you can do it if you do it in a slightly more structured way. And where we are now is absolutely not this.
Well, the best example of that, of course, was the CHIPS Act, a $50 billion initiative to bring chips manufacturing to the United States and to wean our dependents off of Taiwan. But the Trump administration has killed the CHIPS Act. So that is probably not going to happen in any meaningful way.
Okay. Agatha and Lauren, let’s kind of wrap up our discussion looking at both solar panels and the automotive sector. These are different than the first two categories that you looked at, in part because this is the forward-looking part of China’s economy. They want to be associated with new technologies. Solar and automotive are very much part of their outreach. Talk to us a little bit about how the distribution of those supply chains, which have been much more aggressive than what we’ve seen in consumer electronics, are shaping out and how you think they’re going to withstand the current challenges.
First, Lauren, to you, and then Agatha, I’d love to get your comments on that. Absolutely. I think maybe we can start with solar panels. This is a sector where China has a really significant cost advantage and that has underpinned its central role in these sort of supply chains. We’ve seen over the past decade its share of global exports increasing to over 54% in 2023. And I think what’s really interesting about it is that it might be a sign of what’s to come for some of the other industries hit by U.S. tariffs.
In particular, if at the end of this trade war we see a relatively significant difference between the tariffs imposed on China versus on some other exporting countries. And so the case study to look at here is actually the U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duties imposed on Chinese solar cell imports back in 2012. At the time, China was by far the largest supplier of U.S. solar panels, accounting for around half of U.S. imports. But due to concerns about unfair Chinese trade practices, the U.S. imposed anti-dumping duties of around 30% and countervailing duties of around 3% to 5%. And this made manufacturing in China much more costly compared to other countries.
So, over the following years, U.S. supply of solar panels shifted away from China and to a handful of countries in Southeast Asia, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. And as of 2023, China has become basically not at all relevant in the U.S. supply of solar panels, and 70% of U.S. solar panels come from these countries. And I think this is relevant because it really shows how these tariffs can create incentives to create supply chains outside of China, again, if there’s enough of a difference between those tariff rates.
Yeah. I mean, what about the rest of the world? So obviously the U.S. is a big consumer, but the rest of the world is also a big player and big demand for Chinese solar panels. You’re absolutely right. I think solar panels are particularly interesting because what we’ve seen is just a complete splintering of the supply chain where Chinese solar panels are mainly serving markets in the EU, plus also in the global south, whereas these ex-China supply chains coming from Southeast Asia and also increasingly now from India and Turkey are looking to serve the U.S. market.
Okay. Agatha, we’re going to close down our conversation on the sectoral verticals that you guys looked at on automotives. This is really the big story of the past couple of years. BYD is setting up factories in Turkey, in Indonesia, in Vietnam. They were going to set up in Mexico. They are setting up in Brazil. They are moving very quickly. And BYD is by no means alone. So many of the Chinese auto majors are moving their production out of China.
What did you find in autos? So we found a few things that we thought were interesting. The first one, there’s a big disconnect, of course, between ICEs and EVs. You have a technology that has… ICEs are internal combustion engines. In ICEs, you still have very decent market shares from Japan and Germany and Central and Eastern Europe and the U.S. to some extent. Mexico, of course, has been dominating as a global hub production in that sector.
Now, when you turn to EV, which is a new kind of technology, but importantly, a new technology that depends on the very China-dominated supply chain, then you get to a completely different picture. And so that is most obvious there. What’s very interesting with solar panels, the same as it is with EVs and batteries, is that we’re in a sector where China’s scale at home means that it’s harder by the year to catch up with China.
And so, in a way, we have China being dominant and still increasing its market share, which is very puzzling. But even in ICE, you’ve got overcapacity in China for a certain part. And for ICE cars, at the end of the day, they’re not going necessarily to the U.S. They’re not going to Europe, but they’re going to Russia. They’re going to a lot of Southeast Asia. They’re going to Latin America. And so you also see China picking up in all of those places, right, and very, very important in the auto sector.
One thing I would note, which is quite interesting as well, is that in a series of sectors, what we observe is that China, because of its absolute competitiveness, its ability to scale, its ability to just produce things, not just cheaply, but efficiently at this stage, which is almost as important as the cost, right? At this point, we’re speaking about just the efficiency of making things in China, means that China is, at the moment, breaking certain business cases.
And auto is a big case here because auto used to be intended to be a very regional affair. You wanted to produce autos close to your end market because there’s a lot of rules; Navarro would say non-trade barriers, but there’s a lot of rules on kind of local auto markets. So you wanted to be close to your consumer, you wanted to be close to your final market, you usually had very regionalized supply chains for tires and for brakes and for engines and things like this.
So you had these hubs; you had one in Europe, you had one in Mexico, and then you had one in China for China. But because China has become so incredibly competitive in making everything, including auto parts, including final autos, then it’s breaking that business model because it actually now starts making sense to ship cars, to ship certain parts that were extremely heavy and didn’t make sense to ship before.
To ship certain goods like tires that didn’t make sense to ship before because on the contrary, they were so cheap, you wanted to make them very close to where you were assembling the car, etc. And so in solar PV, in wind, in places like this, but in cars in particular, you see kind of China’s competitiveness just breaking some of the things we held true as business cases for certain industries. And that is highly, highly disruptive, right?
And it makes it so much harder for any country, be it advanced economies, the U.S., or be it emerging economies, to catch up. And this is where we see the barriers. I should add very quickly, waiting one more year with the U.S. tariffs at the moment, and waiting one more year for China’s competitiveness to solidify, to continue, for them to get better, not just at price and at scaling, but also at tech.
And at just making a ton of a whole lot of things and a whole lot of products in a whole lot of sectors better and cheaper. It will be harder by next year to diversify. And that will have been a year lost in that whole trend. Right.
And not to mention, until 2030, what you guys mapped out in your report, the changes are going to be absolutely enormous. Juliana, we’re going to give you the last word in our discussion today to help us make sense of the report and put it in the context of everything that’s been going on and what we’ve been talking about vis-a-vis the tariff war that is now underway.
What do you want people to take away from this report in terms of how to understand the future of Chinese supply chains? I guess that this is an incredibly complicated process and that it takes years, a lot of time and effort for these supply chains to reconfigure, and that there are a lot of moving parts, a lot of countries involved.
And I suppose that contrast is showing how the first U.S. trade war already had an effect in moving these supply chains, but nonetheless, China remains so dominant. I think really needs to be seen in the perspective of what the U.S. has just started now and what it hopes to achieve, especially now that it’s not just hit China, but a whole range of other countries.
Yeah. Well, the report is “China and the Future of Global Supply Chains,” even though it was written in February, two months before Liberation Day, still 100 percent relevant in terms of understanding where they’ve been and where they’re going. No one has a complete grasp on what’s happening because, as Agatha said, it’s a violent process that is underway.
I love that, Agatha. And it was written by Agatha Kratz and her team at Rhodium Group, Juliana Bouchot and Lauren Piper, who’s now at Princeton University. We’ve had two Princeton folks on this week alone. So go Tigers. I think you guys are the Tigers. Is that right?
Okay. So we’ll put links to the report in the show notes and to some of the other great research that Rhodium does as well. I want to thank all of you for joining us today to help us try and make sense of what’s going on, even though it is incredibly difficult to do that.
So, Agatha, Juliana, and Lauren, thank you so much for your time today. Thank you. Thank you, Eric. It was lovely to be with you. And we’ll be back again with another edition of the China Global South podcast next week when Kobus and Jiro are back from Nairobi. Until then, I’m Eric Olander. Thank you so much for listening and for watching. The discussion continues online.
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Hello, and welcome to a second edition this week of the China Global South podcast, which is a proud member of the Sinica podcast network. I’m Eric Olander. Unfortunately, Giraud and Kobus are unable to join us today as they’re attending a conference in Nairobi. However, we’ll have them back on Friday for our Africa show, and there’s been quite a bit happening in the China-Africa space, so be sure to catch that.
Today, we’re dropping a second episode of the China Global South podcast due to the significant events unfolding globally, especially in the markets here in Asia. Watching Wall Street’s tumultuous overnight performance was indeed concerning—up one moment, down the next, filled with rumors and uncertainty. Today, we’ll be discussing tariffs and supply chains.
Donald Trump has recently threatened China with an additional 50% tariff on goods imported into the U.S. unless China retracts its 34% counter-tariff. Undoubtedly, we are entrenched in a world trade war, a topic we discussed yesterday with Kyle Chan from Princeton University. These recent counter-tariffs and tariff actions represent the latest developments in this ongoing conflict.
This means that U.S. companies could potentially face a total tariff rate of 104% on Chinese imports. The new 50% threat from Trump combines with the 20% tariffs imposed in March and last week’s 34% tariffs. Such a staggering 104% could effectively halt U.S.-China trade, which exceeded $525 billion last year, underscoring the enormity of the situation.
Unlike some other countries that have accommodated the United States, Beijing has made it clear that it will not back down. On Tuesday, they stated that they would “fight until the end.” They argued that U.S. tariff abuses seriously infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of nations, violate WTO rules, undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system, and destabilize the global economic order. This reflects a typical case of unilateralism, protectionism, and economic coercion, which has drawn condemnation from the international community. China is resolute in its opposition to these actions.
Let me reiterate: trade wars and tariff wars lead to no winners, and protectionism is a dead end. The Chinese people neither cause trouble nor fear it, and attempting to pressure or extort China is not an effective strategy. China will take necessary measures to protect its legitimate rights and interests. If the U.S. chooses to persist in this tariff and trade war, regardless of the consequences for both countries and the international community, China is prepared to respond resolutely.
The reference to fighting until the end has certainly made headlines across Asia and sent shivers through the markets. Investors were further unsettled this week when White House trade advisor Peter Navarro told CNBC that Vietnam’s proposal to eliminate tariffs on U.S. imports would not suffice. This is notable since Vietnam currently boasts the third-largest trade surplus with the U.S., totaling $123 billion, positioning it as a target for the Trump administration.
However, optimism was briefly sparked last week when Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Toh Lam spoke with Donald Trump, suggesting potential agreements. There was speculation that if Vietnam were to purchase more Boeing planes, build Trump golf courses, increase natural gas purchases, and permit Elon Musk’s Starlink internet service, it could lead to a resolution.
Yet, all this optimism was shaken on Monday when Navarro clarified on CNBC that Vietnam’s offer wouldn’t be enough. The White House administration is angered by the phenomenon known as transshipments, wherein Chinese goods made in China are sent to Vietnam, repackaged, and exported to the U.S., thereby avoiding tariffs.
Now, let’s hear from Peter Navarro on the thinking at the White House: “What we have here is a national emergency driven by massive, chronic trade deficits resulting from systematically higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers. When you ask if we’re open to negotiation, the president is always willing to listen. However, we must recognize the core issue.
Looking at Vietnam, for every dollar we sell them, they sell us $15. Of that $15, about $5 is transshipped from China to Vietnam to sidestep tariffs. This results in a detrimental dumping into U.S. markets, harming various sectors including our shrimpers and manufacturers of metal brackets, kitchen cabinets, and agricultural products. Moreover, they are involved in intellectual property theft, with the Department of Commerce citing many cases of dumping.
The message is clear: any country wanting to engage with us must focus on lowering non-tariff barriers. Vietnam currently imposes a 10% VAT, while Europe has a 19% VAT. Competing against such rates is challenging, and the VAT issue can be confusing since it’s primarily a domestic tax incurred by consumers within those countries rather than a trade issue.
Trade policy experts in Cambodia, Mexico, Brazil, and throughout the global south likely experienced unease listening to Navarro, especially given the 10 to 15-year trend of China relocating significant portions of its supply chains offshore. If the U.S. perceives these as transshipments that prevent achieving tariff goals, coming to agreements to eliminate these tariffs will become increasingly difficult.
That’s why I’m thrilled to welcome three experts to the show today to help us dissect these developments and their effects on Chinese supply chains. The team at the Rhodium Group, a leading China consultancy based in Washington, along with offices in New York and Paris, produced a report earlier this year titled “China and the Future of Global Supply Chains.”
This report, penned by Agatha Kratz, a partner at Rhodium leading corporate advisory work, delves into crucial trends within this sector. She is joined by Juliana Bouchot, a senior analyst, and Lauren Piper, currently working on graduate studies at Princeton University but previously part of the Rhodium team. Thank you all for joining us today; your timing coincides perfectly with our discussion of your report.
Agatha, let’s begin with you. As the team lead, how do you react to Peter Navarro’s comments and the unfolding events since your report was published in February?
One of the motivations behind our report was the continuous reference to Vietnam as a transshipment hub. We aimed to investigate whether data supports these claims, whether what’s occurring in Vietnam amounts to legitimate transshipping or just final assembly. If the assembly heavily relies on inexpensive, subsidized Chinese inputs—merely assembling them in Vietnam before exporting to the U.S.—that’s also problematic.
Alternatively, we wanted to see if genuine supply chains are developing in Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and other ASEAN nations, which is one of the key findings of the report. We uncovered two parallel truths. First, China remains a dominant global manufacturing power and has, in fact, increased its share of manufacturing exports across various sectors. We examined four sectors: textiles, electronics, cars, and solar PV, and found that China’s share is still rising.
Simultaneously, emerging manufacturing hubs are gaining ground in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam. There’s undeniable transshipment activity taking place, where goods are shipped to Vietnam, relabeled, and exported to the U.S. Yet, a significant number of final assembly operations are also occurring in Vietnam with various suppliers relocating there.
After several years since the first trade war, it’s clear that deep supply chains are taking root in ASEAN. This should alleviate concerns among people like Peter Navarro regarding Vietnam’s activities. However, the recent disruptions have been severe and could jeopardize this progress if they persist.
Juliana, if you had the opportunity to speak with Peter Navarro about Agatha’s insights regarding Chinese supply chains in Vietnam, what would you say?
I would emphasize that our report underscores two critical dimensions to consider when analyzing how quickly diversification is likely to occur. First, there are national policies and the intensity of de-risking, and second, there’s China’s comparative manufacturing advantage in terms of efficiency and cost.
The extent to which alternative production hubs can reliably assume some of China’s share is pivotal. The policies currently in place—across-the-board tariffs on countries, including potential partners for diversifying away from China—may actually contribute to greater supply chain stagnation and inflation, rather than meaningful restructuring in the short term.
Yes, Agatha point’s out that the aggressive approach could lead to rising costs and stoke inflation, not just in the United States but globally. Lauren, one intriguing aspect of your report is its dual focus: backward-looking and forward-looking. You analyze trends over the last decade while also projecting until 2030.
Could you share your thoughts on both perspectives? Specifically, you’ve made it clear that diversification of Chinese supply chains has been underway since before this year’s upheavals. As you look to 2030, how might your assumptions have been disrupted by the aggressive policies we’ve witnessed?
In reviewing the report, I’d reiterate Agatha’s observation: China remains highly dominant in various supply chains. For instance, in apparel, where other production hubs like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Cambodia have gained traction, China still accounted for over 30% of global exports in 2023, remaining a primary supporter of key inputs such as buttons and fabrics.
The crucial determining factor moving forward will be resultant tariff levels. Trump’s calls for tariffs on other production hubs—like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Cambodia—significantly inflates the cost of doing business. While we’ve witnessed diversification, if tariff disparities between China and its alternatives remain minimal, many supply chains might persist in China due to its efficiencies.
Even as labor costs rise in China, the advantages of optimized supply chains can mitigate these costs. For example, a jeans manufacturer with 20 years of operation in Cambodia is contemplating whether to relocate back to China due to the latter’s superior production capabilities.
Focusing on the apparel sector—where shifts have been occurring for the past 15 years—it may not be as financially feasible if tariffs reach 46% on Vietnamese goods or 50% on those from Cambodia. Recently, the U.S. also reverted its previous policy to exempt products under $800 direct from China, impacting platforms like Xi’an and Timu.
As a result, Americans who have grown accustomed to purchasing multiple items online may find such options curtailed. Are we truly prepared for a scenario in which the United States experiences the effects of losing affordable Chinese products?
Absolutely. It will be fascinating to see how companies like Xi’an and Timu respond, considering they currently face no tariffs. If those rates leap to 100% or even higher, it will leave them vulnerable. Although some of these companies have begun to explore diversifying their supply chains to countries like Brazil, Turkey, and Mexico, they still predominantly manufacture in China to benefit from the extensive network of local suppliers capable of producing trendy items quickly.
Moreover, they are reportedly under pressure from the Ministry of Commerce to maintain manufacturing within China. Consequently, the final cost of these products for U.S. consumers will largely depend on how tariffs are structured. If tariffs are broadly imposed not only on China but also on Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Cambodia, it substantially complicates efforts to reduce costs.
Agatha, when we consider Lauren’s insights into the apparel sector, it’s clear that similar dynamics apply across several other sectors you’ve examined. Let’s shift to consumer electronics. How are we adapting to a reality where future visibility is limited?
Before diving into consumer electronics, could you share some insights into your client conversations regarding current concerns and their responses to such dramatic changes?
Certainly! It’s essential to break this down into short-term, medium-term, and long-term perspectives for clarity. In the short term, we will likely see a lot of wait-and-see behaviors from investors and businesses gauging the progress of U.S.-China negotiations and broader economic indicators.
If I were a company today, I’d hold off for one or two months to see how discussions with India evolve, as we view it as an emerging market having potential for a trade agreement with the Trump administration.
It’s critical to monitor upcoming inflation figures, trade statistics, employment numbers, and market trends resulting from announcements. At this juncture, the shocking effects of the Trump administration’s recent actions have triggered significant disruptions, which cannot be sustained indefinitely.
The pressing question is how will this tumult stabilize? Could it transform on a sector basis, with some industries allowed to bring in goods duty-free, or will it orchestrate on a country-specific basis? For example, should India secure a deal, will more countries follow suit?
For the medium-term, we must look for insights regarding influential figures in the Trump administration and their overarching economic goals. This period may offer a clearer perspective on policy drivers, although certainty will always be elusive in the next four years.
Looking long-term, identifying countries offering competitive tax rates is crucial. For instance, nations like Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco with lower tax rates may present attractive opportunities compared to higher rates faced by countries like Vietnam.
However, transshipment is an ongoing concern, as excessive reliance on Chinese inputs isn’t favored by the U.S. administration. So, a responsive action-reaction cycle will persist. The Trump administration will be vigilant about enforcing regulations against illegal behaviors and transshipments from Chinese value additions.
As we navigate this current environment, it’s an extended game. Monitoring trends and developments will be crucial for companies planning their next steps.
Interestingly, we observe that countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile might emerge as significant beneficiaries as China pivots away from U.S. agriculture in favor of other suppliers, a shift that could also advantage Europe.
Interestingly, a video gaining traction on Chinese social media portrayed overweight Americans sewing T-shirts—a stark contrast to the reality of labor dynamics in the U.S. Given American consumers’ demand for low-cost products, it’s impractical to expect that competitive wages would support such job creation.
Juliana, now let’s discuss consumer electronics. You mentioned that this sector is notably distinct due to China’s dominance. What makes consumer electronics, like phones and computers, a different case?
Eric, may I interject?
Absolutely!
Thanks! Lauren conducted the research on electronics, so let’s pivot to her expertise now.
Lauren, the spotlight is now on you regarding consumer electronics. Please share your insights.
The fundamental takeaway regarding consumer electronics is that China remains exceedingly dominant in this sector.
Historically, electronics has featured intricately woven global supply chains. Take the smartphone or laptop, for instance; it typically contains components from various countries, with chips often designed in the U.S., produced in Taiwan, and assembled in China, Vietnam, or India alongside components from South Korea and Germany.
This sector’s complex, globally integrated supply chains have traditionally shifted due to variations in production costs and skills. However, as we’ve seen in other industries, China’s prominent role challenges this dynamic.
Over the past 15 years, China has exported more electronics than every other country combined, claiming 65% of laptop and tablet exports and half of smartphone exports by value. Moreover, it is essential to note that the reliance on costs applies not only to finished products but also to components.
Even as certain final assembly operations shift to countries like Vietnam and India—especially for firms like Apple and Samsung—these supply chains still heavily depend on machinery, components, and expertise sourced from China.
Regarding U.S. tariffs, a glimmer of hope exists for electronics: there is existing manufacturing capacity outside China. For instance, Apple has built substantial capabilities in India and Vietnam that they can leverage to redirect some production toward the U.S. market.
There have been reports indicating that Apple plans to shift all its production in India to cater to U.S. demand. However, due to China’s central role in the electronic supply chain, offshore manufacturing sites cannot fully fulfill U.S. demand. Reports suggest that even if Apple transfers all production from India, it can only cover around 50% of current U.S. demand.
For the U.S., this signifies an unavoidable reality: there’s no hiding from tariffs, and American consumers will inevitably feel the impact. Apple, as a flagship brand, has particularly drawn focus from the Trump administration. Analysts conclude that transitioning the entire Apple supply chain to the U.S. is virtually unachievable.
Even Tim Cook, a supply chain expert by background, acknowledges that there’s an abundance of seasoned supply chain engineers in China, making it difficult to find a comparable workforce in the U.S.
Moreover, it’s not solely about the iPhone; hundreds of suppliers contribute to Apple’s supply chain. Notably, anyone who’s been in southern China, including Dongguan or Guangdong province, recognizes the unparalleled infrastructure built for efficient product transport compared to U.S. ports like Long Beach and Oakland, which cannot handle similar volumes.
Considering the need to manufacture 50 to 60 million iPhones when launching a new product, Apple has an immense logistical undertaking to manage in a tightly constrained time frame.
Lauren, is it feasible to enact Trump’s vision of relocating the Apple supply chain to the U.S. based on your findings?
Achieving that would be extraordinarily challenging. Following the initial tariffs from Trump’s first term, Apple began seeking alternatives, investing heavily in relocation efforts in Vietnam and India.
Despite this push, the company remains significantly reliant on China, and navigating the costs involved with relocating operations presents its own set of hurdles. No other country replicates the scale and production efficiencies China offers.
In short, the likelihood of reshoring significant portions of electronics production to the U.S. in the near term is extremely low.
Additionally, even if Rational, a structured approach exists to transition electronics manufacturing back to the U.S., it would necessitate a gradual implementation of tariffs over ten years. Permitting temporary imports from Vietnam while progressively amending tariff policies could provide companies the stability needed to adapt.
Yet the current tumultuous environment complicates investments, as uncertainty regarding forthcoming tariff policies hinder firms from committing resources.
The CHIPS Act was a prime example of a successful initiative aimed at localizing chip production in the U.S., but such initiatives have faced turmoil under the Trump administration—making meaningful progress unlikely.
Agatha and Lauren, as we wind down our discussion, let’s turn our attention to the solar and automotive sectors. Both are vital to China’s strategic vision for new technologies. How is the landscape of these sectors modified, and what challenges lie ahead?
Lauren, let’s begin with solar panels. Chinese dominance in this sector largely stems from significant cost advantages, which have solidified its central position within global supply chains. Over the last decade, China’s share of global solar panel exports rose to over 54% in 2023.
This raises pertinent questions regarding the potential ramifications of tariffs on this sector, particularly if differences between China’s rates and those imposed on other countries remain stark. Rewinding to the U.S. anti-dumping duties on Chinese solar cell imports from 2012, China then dominated U.S. solar panel supply, yet these tariffs incentivized a shift to Southeast Asian countries like Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Now, in 2023, China barely registers in U.S. solar supplies, with 70% coming from these other countries. This illustrates how tariffs can foster the establishment of supply chains outside China if there’s sufficient disparity in imposed rates.
What about the global landscape? Beyond the U.S., there’s a considerable demand for Chinese solar panels in other markets, such as the EU and the global south. You’re right! There’s an ongoing fragmentation of the supply chain, with Chinese solar panels predominantly serving European and global south markets, while the emerging supply chains from Southeast Asia—now also including India and Turkey—target the U.S. market.
Agatha, let’s discuss the automotive sector. BYD is rapidly setting up factories and expanding production in Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Brazil. What stood out in your analysis of this sector?
Several trends emerged regarding the automotive landscape. We notice a pronounced distinction between internal combustion engines (ICEs) and electric vehicles (EVs). For ICEs, market shares from nations like Japan, Germany, and Mexico persist.
However, in the EV sector, which relies heavily on China’s supply dominance, a different narrative unfolds. China’s ongoing competitiveness is working against other countries attempting to catch up, blurring established business models in the auto sector.
China’s capacity enables it to manufacture a wide array of components, making it viable to ship certain goods that previously wouldn’t have made economic sense.
Moreover, as we observe developments in solar panels and EVs, China’s growing competitive edge complicates the landscape for both advanced and emerging economies striving to achieve parity.
The urgency lies in the speed of shifts—what we discover now will differ significantly in just a year due to China’s consistent advancements and efficiencies in production.
Lastly, Juliana, as we summarize our conversation, what key takeaways do you wish to illuminate regarding the long-term understanding of Chinese supply chains amid the current tariff climate?
I want to emphasize the complexity involved in this process. Years of time and effort are necessary for these supply chains to reorganize, with multiple countries involved.
It’s crucial to acknowledge the effects from previous U.S. trade conflicts while recognizing that China retains its position of strength. As the U.S. escalates its actions against not just China but also a wider array of countries, the future landscape of supply chains remains uncertain and intricately intertwined.
The report titled “China and the Future of Global Supply Chains,” written by Agatha Kratz and her team at Rhodium Group—Juliana Bouchot and Lauren Piper—offers invaluable insights. Although it was published in February, it remains highly relevant to understanding the past trajectories influencing the current landscape.
Thank you to Agatha, Juliana, and Lauren for joining us today and contributing to our understanding of these complex dynamics.
We’ll be back next week with another episode of the China Global South podcast, featuring Kobus and Giraud returning from Nairobi. Until then, I’m Eric Olander. Thank you for tuning in and participating in this discussion. Connect with us online and explore more at ChinaGlobalSouth.com.