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Lessons From Southeast Asia on How to Manage Great Power Rivalries

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Hello and welcome to another edition of the China Global South podcast, a proud member of the Seneca Podcast Network. I’m Eric Olander, and as always, I’m joined by CGSP’s Managing Editor, Kobus van Staden from beautiful Cape Town, South Africa. A very good afternoon to you, Kobus.

Good afternoon. Kobus, we are recording this in the midst of an incredible tragedy that unfolded here in Southeast Asia last week. A massive 7.7 earthquake shook Mandalay in Myanmar and really was felt throughout the entire region, all the way as far as Ho Chi Minh City. It shook Bangkok into Yunnan province in China. At the time of this recording right now, there are at least 1,700 people dead in Myanmar. That is a figure that we expect to go up a lot. This part of the world is not accustomed to these massive earthquakes that are common in places like Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia. They just don’t happen with the kind of frequency that they happen here.

I’ve been living in Southeast Asia for almost 15 years now, and never have I seen this kind of quake on the Southeast Asian mainland. What was noticeable, though, Kobus, and this is for the purposes of our discussion, I wrote about this to our subscribers in our Monday edition, is that this is the first major international humanitarian disaster that has happened since the Trump administration deactivated, I don’t even know what the word they’re using for it these days, but basically cut USAID. Normally, when there are these big humanitarian disasters, the United States government, in some form or another, usually through USAID, is very visible, very prominent on the ground. They have the capacity to respond at a scale and speed and with an experience that very few other countries have been able to do.

That is no longer the case. The United States so far is not visible in Myanmar in the relief effort, but you know who is? The Chinese. They came in very, very quick and fast. Two Chinese Y-20 cargo planes, those are like the C-130s that the United States have, landed with dogs, with personnel, $14 million worth of aid. Air China cargo planes were coming into Myanmar regularly. We saw teams deployed from Hong Kong, from Yunnan province, from other parts of China. At least 200 personnel have been there. Chinese technology has been on full display using advanced tech. This has been a showcase for the Chinese, and Chinese propaganda has been very busy. Chinese state media, with what I interpreted as the implicit message that says, we’re here, and they’re not.

What was your reading of what’s been going on in the geopolitics of this humanitarian disaster?

Yeah, I mean, I think it’s almost more than implicit. I think that is kind of what they’re saying. They were really framing it as a kind of a South-South and Asia-Asia solidarity effort. It’s also notable that the U.S. did allocate or announced the allocation of $2 million in aid, but they also said it would be distributed by human rights organizations or non-affiliated human rights organizations on the ground in Myanmar, which considering that Myanmar is a highly autocratic government in the middle of a civil war, I’m not sure who those are.

And also, they are supposed to have dispatched a team, a small rescue team, although that team has apparently not been able to actually enter the country yet. So no one is actually sure where they are or how late they’ll arrive, or when they’ll arrive. They’ve already missed the 72-hour rescue window. So yeah, overall, I think China’s really riding the propaganda pony on this one. They’re really kind of going hard, and their spokespeople have really been posting montages of rescue of Chinese and Myanmar workers working together to rescue people from the rubble and so on.

So I think, yeah, they’re really going full press on this. Just to be very clear here, China was by no means the only responder from the region. Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, and India also sent teams. India was one of the first to send teams as well. In many respects, this also aligns with a very important Chinese narrative that they’ve been talking about for a very long time, which is Asia for Asians. We’ve heard that, Kobus, in the context of Africa, that China supports Africa for Africans. And that is a message that they have to basically talk about not having Europe and the United States in these regions, specifically the United States here in Asia.

What we’re seeing in Myanmar is that playing out. And I think that Chinese policymakers must be very pleased with what they see, of course, the tragedy aside. Well, let’s talk about Southeast Asia. And it’s, again, the focus of so much that’s going on in the great power competition. We just had U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth out here. He was in the Philippines and he was in Japan. Interestingly, saying a very different story than when Pete Hegseth was in Europe talking to allies there. In Europe, both Pete Hegseth and the U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance have been very aggressive. They have a very different tone when they talk to military allies out here in Asia.

Pete Hegseth said, we will be shoulder to shoulder. Ironclad is the way he described the partnership with the Philippines. And what this brings up is the different approaches that countries that are having territorial disputes with the Chinese in the South China Sea are taking. So the Philippines firmly leaning into foreign alliances, not only with the United States, but France, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand. Go down the list. Canada. And there’s a long and growing list of countries that the Philippines is signing deals with, security partnerships, visiting forces agreements, all these different things.

Vietnam is another country that is also engaged in longstanding territorial disputes. Let’s not forget the last war that China fought was in 1979, a border war with Vietnam. So these tensions are longstanding. And there was a fascinating article in The Diplomat that came out, what Southeast Asian countries can learn from Vietnam’s history negotiating territorial disputes with China, because there is a very sharp contrast between how Vietnam is approaching territorial disputes with China and how the Philippines and other countries are as well.

It was written by Kang Vu, who’s a visiting scholar in the political science department at Boston College. And he’s an old friend of the shows. And we’re welcoming him back to the program from Boston, a very chilly Boston, I presume. A very good morning to you, Kang.

Yeah, we are in the third winter right now. It’s really unpredictable. It was 80s a few weeks ago, but now it’s back to like 30, 40. Yeah, that third winter, Kobus, this is something you wouldn’t understand. That third winter is when you think spring is there, and then bam, you get hit with a snowstorm. It’s so demoralizing.

So, Kang, let’s talk about this fascinating piece that you wrote. And again, you’re bringing a lot of your own experience as one of just the most fascinating Vietnam watchers and political scientists in this space and seeing the difference in the strategies that are being taken and the response that China has towards these two different countries. You write, Vietnam’s experience suggests to other Southeast Asian countries that the involvement of an extra regional great power in a small power’s territorial disputes with China hardened, not relaxed, Chinese stance towards the dispute. Can you expand on that?

So, I have to say that the inspiration for this article starts with a lot of the Southeast Asian country reaction to the United States pivoting to Indo-Pacific. Like you said about Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth went to the Philippines just last week, and then he had a different way of talking to the Southeast Asian ally compared to the European ally. And then I realized that, wow, that is really different compared to other administrations. So, the United States must be really serious about pivoting to Asia-Pacific right now.

And then I look at other Southeast Asian countries like Singapore, like Malaysia. They were saying like, hey, maybe the United States is not the country that we want to be in the region. Like maybe Southeast Asian countries need to be independent. Maybe these countries need to be taking care of their own defense. So, I think that’s really interesting because the Southeast Asian country was supposed to join hand with the United States to balance against China. And now they are saying like, hey, like, no. They’re kind of really cautious about that. And I really like to explain this puzzle.

And then that brings me to the experience between Vietnam and the Philippines right now, as we see in the South China Sea dispute, is that the thing about that is Vietnam has been expanding its territorial holding over these South China Sea islands for quite a lot, especially with the latest report coming out of the Center for Strategic International Studies saying that Vietnam’s land holding in the South China Sea is like three-fourths of China’s holding.

And I mean, that is really huge compared to the resort disparity between Vietnam and China. And then when you look at the Philippines, the Chinese, they are really aggressive when the Philippines was just trying to resupply its outposts in the sea. The Philippines is not trying to expand its island. It is not trying to militarize its island by any means. But the Chinese, they are really, really aggressive about it.

But the Vietnamese, on the other hand, the Chinese have been really silent. I don’t want to say whether they agree or they disagree with that, but they have been silent about Vietnamese activities. And that is really… Well, they did do live fire military exercises in the Gulf of Tonkin. And they did mention a little bit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, just a little bit, though. So, yeah, I think that there may be some signal about some kind of upset with the Vietnamese behavior, but they have not taken any aggressive behavior to the degree that they did vis-à-vis the Philippines to stop the Vietnamese from expanding their island.

And I mean, that is huge because when we look at the Philippines and Vietnam, one country, the U.S. ally, the Philippines, and the other country, Vietnam, is simply neutral. And that just shows that something is at play here, because the Chinese, they seem to treat a U.S. ally so differently from how they treat a non-U.S. ally, Vietnam. So, I want to go back in history and see that, okay, so was Vietnam ever allied with a great foreign power to contest the Chinese claim?

So, that brought us back to the third Indochina war, when Vietnam actually allied with the Soviet Union. To settle its land-border dispute with China, it covered Thun Kim dispute with China, and also the South China Sea dispute with China. The thing about those three disputes is that they are not different from the dispute that we see today. Like, both governments, they were so determined to assert what they claim. They were so determined not to give in to other parties.

And the Vietnamese, they wanted the Soviet support to help them get what they want from the dispute with the Chinese. And you know what happened after? The Chinese got so mad at the Vietnamese effort to rely on the Soviet Union that they launched an attack against Vietnamese border posts along the Vietnam-China border. They occupied a lot of strategic hilltops throughout the 1980s, and especially, they even occupied Vietnam-Johnson-South Reef in 1988.

So, basically, the Chinese are telling the Vietnamese that, hey, you want to rely on an extra-regional great power to contest my claim? You cannot do it, because what we can do is that we can bleed you to death. And then we can show that the great power cannot defend you when you need them the most. So, what happened is that after the Vietnamese, they pretty much withdrew from the alliance with the Soviet Union due to the Soviet retrenchment, and they withdrew from Cambodia at the same time.

The Chinese said, like, hey, now it’s time to mend the ties between those two countries. And immediately after the Soviet withdrew its interest from Indochina, then the Vietnamese and the Chinese, they normalized diplomatic relations in November of 1991. And they even delayed settling these territorial disputes so that they could mend the ties first. That is something really important here with us.

Like, back in the late 1970s, when the Chinese attacked the Vietnamese, the number one problem on the table was Vietnam’s territory dispute with China. But now the Chinese were saying that, hey, we could kick the can down the road, and then we can mend the ties first, and then we can settle those disputes later. And after that, you have the Vietnam and China land border treaty in 1999 and the Gulf of Tonkin treaty in 2000. That pretty much settled the two major territorial disputes between Vietnam and China.

So, you can see that the Chinese had been really compromising over that aspect with the Vietnamese, yes. And so, to sum up the argument, it’s a very interesting kind of argument for me, because I think the logic that we’ve seen, you know, around, for example, the Philippines is this idea, and you frequently see this logic in Africa-China discussions as well, is that individual African states or a small country like the Philippines is so weak that a bilateral negotiation between it and China is fundamentally, basically, like, there’s no point in doing it, essentially, you know, kind of because of the power imbalance.

But you’re essentially arguing that these countries are getting more maneuverability, like, actually, in this despite the power imbalance, in a bilateral discussion, rather than when you start kind of pulling other people, other powers into the situation.

Yeah, I think that is a really interesting observation as well, because when we look at the result of the Vietnam-China border settlements, the land border dispute is that Vietnam and China pretty much got half and half of the disputed land. And over the Gulf of Tonkin, Vietnam even got a little bit more, because this is an island that is straddling between, literally, in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin. So, Vietnam got 53% compared to China’s 47%.

The thing is that when Vietnam involved the Soviet Union in, the Chinese simply just cut all the talks. They said that we don’t want to negotiate with you when you ally with the Soviet Union, that’s it. So, I think that there is a lot of parallels compared to the situation right now in Southeast Asia, especially the Philippines. Is that the Philippines want to involve the United States in to settle the dispute with China? And I think that it’s a really bad move, because the Chinese, they simply either will not talk to the Philippines, or they will coerce the Philippines until the Philippines drop the idea of involving the United States into the game.

So, I think that is one of the Chinese calculations as well, because they want to neutralize the Southeast Asian country. And there are two ways to do it. Either you coerce them, like the Chinese did to the Vietnamese in the 1980s and 70s, or the Chinese can simply just accommodate these countries’ territorial demands in exchange for these countries staying neutral.

So, in the case of Vietnam in the 1990s, the Chinese simply said that, hey, let’s settle the dispute on an equal footing, 50-50, and then you stay neutral. That’s why Vietnam has been staying neutral ever since the 1990s so that they can maintain friendly ties with the Chinese. But if you’re the Philippines, and you look at your options that are available right now, and again, I just want to play devil’s advocate here, you’ll see that because Vietnam has a land border that gives it more options, and also Vietnam has the confidence that it has already fought a war with China, and it’s had this relationship with China that extends back thousands of years.

And so it has a deeper knowledge of engagement with China just because of its physical proximity to it. Every day, people crossing that border teaches you things, right? But when you see the power imbalance that exists between the Philippines and China, particularly in maritime capacity, what choice does the Philippines have other than to partner up with a great power? Because on its own, it would really be outmatched on every front. There’s not a metric that the Philippines would be able to rival the Chinese.

And even in that confidence of mounting an insurgency campaign, the way that the Vietnamese did against the Americans, where they were outgunned, but they out-innovated the Americans in their warfighting tactics, there’s not a lot of evidence that the Philippines has that kind of experience to do that, at least in the modern era. So when they looked at their options, they said, either we face the Chinese ourselves and have to negotiate what would probably be a terrible deal because they, at the end of the day, have far more power, or we take our chances that we ally ourselves with the U.S., who may or may not enforce its treaty, but at the same time, we’re going to have insurance policies with Japan, with New Zealand, with South Korea, with French, with the Canadians, and all the others.

Walk us through the calculations that you think might have happened in Malacañang Palace in Manila in terms of these decisions that they made.

I would have to say that Vietnam is in a more geopolitically vulnerable position compared to the Philippines.

Vulnerable position? Interesting.

Okay. More vulnerable compared to the Philippines. Like, you have a land border with China that the Chinese, they can coerce you whenever they want to. The Philippines and China is at least separated by a bit of ocean between them. So, the Chinese, they cannot directly coerce the Philippines. Like, I mean, the Chinese, they can coerce the Philippine fishermen. They can coerce the Philippines maritime outposts and the South China Sea. But these kinds of coercion cannot be compared in terms of intensity compared to the Chinese border code.

And just to further your point, Vietnam oftentimes relies on China for electricity, for water, for trade. All of that crosses that land border. So, that’s other points of leverage that the Chinese would have to bolster your point.

So, obviously, the Vietnamese, when they entered the negotiation with the Chinese in the 1990s, they simply had no card to play against the Chinese. You just lost your only great power ally, the Soviet Union. You understood that the Chinese can launch a second invasion in Vietnam at any time, especially when the Vietnamese were still occupied with the problem in Cambodia. The Vietnamese economy was going bankrupt in the 1990s. Basically, the Vietnamese have no leverage vis-à-vis the Chinese in the 1990s.

But the outcome was that the Chinese were willing to split everything half-in-half with the Vietnamese. And that is something really remarkable here, is that the Chinese understood their leverage, but they wanted to stick the relationship with Vietnam over the long term. Like, you can coerce your neighbor for just one or two times in the 1990s. But if your neighbor is not happy, then the Chinese could not safeguard their southern border.

Because their long-term strategy policy has always been to maintain a friendly border with Vietnam so that they can bolster their trade, especially to foster economic development in the southern province. But the Philippines, like, they have a lot of options compared to Vietnam in the 1990s. You have an option between them, which can be the Philippines and China. The Chinese cannot coerce the Philippines to threaten the Philippines’ survival.

I mean, the worst the Philippines can endure is to lose a few more islands in the South China Sea. The Chinese were not going to invade the mainland of the Philippines, the main island of the Philippines. The Philippines can either stay neutral. They can either say no to the Americans. They can either join hands with the Chinese to settle the dispute. At least the Philippines have more options. But Vietnam in the 1990s, there is no option. You either man-tied with the Chinese or you don’t. And that’s it.

Is that what you would recommend today to Philippine policymakers, that they’re misplaying their hand right now, that they would be better off negotiating a settlement with the Chinese than facing them militarily? I would say that if the Philippines can strike a deal with the Chinese in exchange for U.S. military involvement, the Chinese would guarantee a 50-50% split like they did with the Vietnamese in the 1990s. And I think that’s a better deal, right? Compared to what the Philippines can get right now. Because right now, what the Philippines get is zero. The Americans are not willing to defend the Philippines anyway, and the Chinese are coercing the Philippines anyway. The Americans say they will. They say they will. We don’t know if that’s really the case, though.

If you look at other cases right now, Vietnam and the Soviet Union were allies, really close allies in the 1970s. So what happened when the Chinese invaded the Vietnamese territory in 1979? The Soviet Union did nothing. They simply just said, “Hey, you can do it on your own. We would not do anything to help you.” What the Soviet Union did in 1988 when the Chinese invaded, occupying Vietnam’s South Johnson, South Reef, was that they did nothing. The Soviet Navy was in Cumberland Bay. They did nothing. So I would not expect the United States to undertake any different course of action.

Even more so when the Soviet Union is a Chinese neighbor. Remember the Sino-Soviet land border? They’re so long that the Chinese can launch an invasion of China at any time that they want to. But even that option was out of the question for the Soviets. To do that was so costly. And the United States is just like a Pacific Ocean away from the Philippines. What could happen to the United States if it did not order its own commitment with the Philippines? It’s like, nothing. You can lose an ally, but the Philippines is not a good ally in the first place to begin with. You can lose a few islands in the South China Sea, and that would not threaten U.S. security in any aspect. The Philippines is not South Korea. It’s not Japan.

I would say that we might need to be really cautious about what the United States prepares to promise to defend the Philippines. There’s recently been talks about possible security cooperation between Vietnam and Indonesia, if I remember correctly. Including cooperation and discussions of territorial and maritime issues.

So far, you mentioned major powers. How does China react to this kind of middle powers in its backyard or in its immediate neighborhood having independent connections with each other? For example, this week, Vietnam announced that it’s buying a whole bunch of weapons from South Korea. In terms of these Asia-Asia interactions, kind of under the shadow of China, how does Beijing see those interactions? I would have to say that Beijing would calculate the net gain in Vietnam’s relations with the other countries.

So let’s say that Vietnam joined hands with Indonesia to balance against China. If I were the Chinese, I would laugh at that because Indonesia is so weak. And Vietnam on its own, even Vietnam with the Soviet Union, could not balance against China. How can Vietnam and Indonesia balance against China? I would not be really upset about it. Especially when the Vietnamese and Indonesians negotiated maritime disputes on the southern edge of the South China Sea. It doesn’t directly impinge upon Chinese interests.

Let’s talk about Vietnam’s weapon purchases as well. Vietnam can buy as many weapons as it wants from South Korea, from Russia, from any other major power, if it wants to. But it will not make a dent in the military imbalance between Vietnam and China. Again, Vietnam allied with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union stationed 44 military divisions along the Sino-Soviet border. The Chinese were still not deterred from launching an invasion against Vietnam. Forty-four Soviet military divisions—that is way more than the amount of weapons that Vietnam can ever buy to balance against China. And China today is significantly stronger militarily than it was back in those days.

Let me try and challenge your theory here, just for the fun of it. What you say is that if a neighboring Asian country aligns with an external power, then China will react more adversely. Now, if we head down to South Asia, we see that India is literally a member of a U.S.-led security arrangement called the Quad, the Quadrennial Security Arrangement. But after a period of four, maybe five years of terrible relations and frozen ties between India and China, a détente is underway. Ambassadors are back in each other’s capitals. Direct flights are starting to come back. The border tensions are starting to ease. Yet we have India, and particularly Modi and Trump, who have a personal affinity for one another.

This is even beyond just a state-to-state relationship. This is a leader-to-leader bond that the two have. Yet the Chinese are engaging in ways that seem to contradict part of your theory that they will react aggressively towards any country that forms these extra power relationships. Can you tell me how India and what’s going on there fits into your theory? I have to say that India is different from other countries because there is a huge range of mountains between India and China, the Himalayas. You cannot fight a great war at the top of the world. It’s different between the Vietnamese and the Chinese land border. It’s pretty flat in some areas.

I’m not saying the northwestern part of Vietnam is not mountainous, but the eastern part near Haiphong Port is really flat. That’s where the Chinese have often invaded Vietnam in the past. When you look at the geography of China, Vietnam is one of the most vulnerable areas because the border is pretty much penetrable. But India, they fought a lot of wars in the past, but they were really limited. You can fight, but it takes a lot of effort to transport, let’s say, a division of troops up to the Himalayas. It’s almost impossible.

So you can see that a lot of the Chinese and Indian military skirmishes are really small in terms of scale. They often fought with sticks and stones. That may sound concerning, but that just shows that China understands the security that the Himalayas bring to its territory. In Central Asia, the small former Soviet countries are so weak that the Chinese would not think of them as security threats at all. And you look at Russia; China and Russia are really friendly in terms of ties.

The kind of 44 Soviet military divisions coercing China from the north is no more. When you look at North Korea, it can be a really bad neighbor, but they are stable. The Chinese are separated from South Korea and Japan by North Korea and the Sea of Japan. Taiwan is also separated from mainland China by the state of Taiwan. Vietnam is the most vulnerable case right there. It’s weak. The border is penetrable. There is a history of border invasion from the Chinese side.

They understand that Vietnam is one of their three main weaknesses. Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina are three flashpoints that the Chinese are always taking care of. Vietnam is one of the most vulnerable countries right there. Moving back slightly to the earlier discussion you mentioned about Southeast Asia starting to worry and wonder about U.S. involvement there.

There’s overlap between Europe and Southeast Asia. In the case of Europe, after the Munich Security Conference, there were about two weeks of European diplomats and bureaucrats writing angry op-eds in Financial Times. Then they pivoted towards a lot more discussion about funding their own militaries and setting up U.S. exclusionary defense arrangements.

Do you foresee a similar process in Eastern Asia/Southeast Asia? I assume we are talking about two different cases here. Do you see a similar kind of coordination appetite and drive to make their security arrangements more independent from the U.S.? I want to say that these countries on their own against China are not that powerful. If you took the U.S. out of the equation, we know the U.S. has dominated the maritime sphere of the Indo-Pacific since at least after World War II.

That could still not stop China from invading or interfering in the Korean War, interfering in the Vietnam War, launching war against Vietnam, and again, going against Soviet Union interests. If the U.S. withdrew from Indo-Pacific and passed the buck to Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and even the entirety of Southeast Asia, these countries on their own would not be able to balance against China.

There are a lot of coordination problems that you mentioned. In terms of capability alone, they would not be able to do it. Yeah, no, no, I think you’re 100 percent right. Sorry to interrupt you. But Kobus, there aren’t the political institutions in this region that would bring these countries together. ASEAN is the closest thing they have, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

That is an institutionally designed weak institution, by design. The members do not want it to be strong. Japan and South Korea are both so intertwined with the U.S. defense establishment, their weapons systems, and their operational systems, that a withdrawal of the U.S. would be debilitating for them to no end. They’ve made their bed with the Americans, and they’re stuck with it.

Also remember, there’s huge distrust between Japan and South Korea and even Japan and other parts of Asia, to some extent. Bringing them together in some kind of security patchwork arrangement absent the United States, there’s just no evidence that that would work. That’s not necessarily the only option, right? What would be another option, though?

Because in the first place, we’re not necessarily talking about replacing the U.S., and we’re also not necessarily talking about opposing China. What I’m thinking of is, are they looking at other kinds of arrangements? Some kind of blue-sky thinking, some other way of working with China, some other way of having some shared Asian decision-making structure—something that doesn’t exist yet? Are there discussions to start reorganizing the architecture of East and Southeast Asian security at all, or is that still a taboo topic?

Kang, I’ll let you take that. I don’t see any hint of what Kobus is talking about. But what do you think? I would just say that the idea behind NATO in Europe is that there isn’t a NATO in Asia simply because the Southeast Asian and East Asian countries are so destructive to each other. They tried in the past with the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization during the Vietnam War, but it was a complete failure because we know that the Chinese assisted North Vietnam to fight against the American-backed South Vietnam.

When South Vietnam collapsed, the SEA Treaty Organization completely fell apart. SEA did not stick together. It did not continue after U.S. withdrawal because the Southeast Asian countries did not have the coordination and the military capability to sustain the organization. SEA was the closest thing we ever got to an Asian NATO, but it still failed. Then you have ASEAN, which is simply a failed attempt at some kind of ASEAN alliance against China.

You have China really on good terms with Cambodia, using money and the Belt and Road Initiative to win trust from the Southeast Asian countries. You also have Thailand, which is a U.S. treaty ally. What the Thais did after the Vietnam War was over was to immediately join hands with the Chinese and normalize relations with China to oppose Vietnam and Indochina. They did not think of the alliance with the United States as a balance against China because they understood they had more to gain from a friendly relation with the Chinese than with the Americans.

You do not see American leadership talk much about the alliance with Thailand because they know it’s just a dead piece of paper. The case of Thailand shows that even a U.S. treaty ally will still join hands with China and oppose any attempt by other countries in Southeast Asia against Chinese interests. This shows how high the bar is to establish any Southeast Asian alliance against China in the absence of U.S. military presence.

If we see the rhetoric coming out of some of the bigger powers in Southeast Asia, Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia has been very favorable to China. In fact, the first visit he made, even before he was named president, was to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping. He is not going to join any anti-China alliance militarily. Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia, same thing, has been very outspoken in defense of Chinese positions on the South China Sea.

He’s not going to join. Then we heard from the Singaporean defense minister, who called the Americans “rent-seeking landlords.” I think that’s the word that defense minister used. Again, he’s not going to join any anti-China coalition. So, against that backdrop, I think we’re just not going to see anywhere near the type of consistency.

We haven’t seen Europe step up to this either. There’s talk that they need to, and the threat is as clear as day that the Americans are done with the Europeans. I think J.D. Vance called them pathetic. It is still to be determined if they’re capable of pulling together to actually do something. Even though the institutions are there and the money is potentially there, is the political will there? We don’t know.

I wish I had prepared the soundbite, but I’ll try my best to kind of recount what former Singaporean Defense Minister George Yeo said in a speech that is now circulating on social media. He talked about why Taiwan should negotiate a settlement with China. It reminds me of what you were discussing with the Philippines and the approach that the Vietnamese are taking. George Yeo’s point is that if you delay the negotiation for 10, 20, or 30 years, projecting out, China’s economy is only going to get bigger, and its military capacity is only going to get stronger.

China already has the capacity to disable American aircraft carriers through hypersonic missiles. Taiwan’s negotiating leverage is only going to diminish as China gets stronger. It seems that’s the same situation with the Philippines. If you count on an extra-regional power while China continues to get stronger within this region, the negotiating leverage will only benefit China.

Can you give me your feedback on my summary of former Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo’s position? It appears to have some parallels with what you’re saying as well. I would have to say that Taiwan and the Philippines are different. When you talk about Taiwan, you’re talking about the fundamental existence of a state.

What kind of negotiation can Taiwan get from China? Maybe to system one country? I don’t know. But with the Philippines, the situation is much more relaxed. The Chinese are not going to occupy the entire Filipino archipelago. What the Chinese can do to the Philippines is occupy all the Philippines holdings in the South China Sea, and that’s it.

So the Philippines has more leeway to negotiate with the Chinese. I hope to say that the Taiwanese are stuck because either they join hands with the Americans, hoping that they will defend them against a Chinese invasion, or if they negotiate a settlement with China, that would still be a Hong Kong model of reunification that would not be beneficial for them in the long term.

The Philippines has many options right now. The Chinese would not even coerce the Philippines. If you look at the case of Vietnam, they may find it acceptable to split half and half of the Philippines over the holdings in the South China Sea. They will not even want to occupy everything that the Philippines has.

I would say that if the Philippines want to try, this is the best time to do so because at least the United States is still in the region. The Philippines and the United States are still treaty allies. Don’t let things deteriorate like they did for the Vietnamese and the Chinese in the 1990s to the extent that Vietnam lost its only major power allies, the economy was bankrupt, and Vietnam had no other option besides negotiating and mending fences with the Chinese without any leverage at all.

We have mostly spoken about Asia, China’s immediate neighborhood, and military issues. Let’s discuss the issue of how people move across borders. In the case of countries further away, like the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Chinese companies are embedded in the country’s strategic mineral sector, Congo is making a show of offering deals to the Trump administration and being vocal about wanting to diversify beyond China.

How does this play out? Do some patterns you identified in terms of dealing with other external powers also play out in cases that are physically further away from China, where it’s not a military issue but more of a geo-economic issue? I think the case here is that I don’t want to speculate too much because the Chinese involvement in Africa is minimal compared to their involvement in Indochina. If I were a great power, then I would not be happy if any other great power is creeping away from my sphere of influence. But that is my sphere of influence. In Africa, it’s not a Chinese sphere of influence.

So everything is open for grabs by China here. The Chinese may try to increase their influence in Africa, but they might not pour in as much as they do in Asia. As many resources or attention to Africa compared to Indo-Pacific. Because the Chinese regard the Indo-Pacific, at least the territory within the first island chain, to be within the Chinese sphere of influence. So I would say that we can say for sure that the Chinese will be really determined to defend their own interests and to coerce these neighbors to neutralize them from the United States or Russia.

But with respect to Africa, I would say that the Chinese will devote less attention and fewer resources then. So I cannot say for sure what kind of dynamic we can expect in Africa, but we can say for sure that if China continues with this current economic growth trajectory, then we can expect to see more Chinese investment in Africa. But we have not seen that the Chinese are being pushed back for their investment in Africa. So we have not seen the United States putting boots on the ground in Africa to fight against the Chinese influence there.

I mean, it’s far-fetched to say the outcome of those scenarios. So I would say that we need to shy away from speculation. I would have to say that maybe the Chinese will not be happy with other countries spending their own influence in Africa, but the Chinese will not take that kind of hard action with respect to the African issues.

Kang, I’m glad we brought up Africa. And it’s interesting because one of the things that we’re seeing in Vietnam—Vietnam is famous for its bamboo diplomacy that former General Secretary Trump pioneered in many respects. Bamboo bends, but it never breaks. It blows with the wind. So diplomatically, the Vietnamese have been very skillful at kind of going with different flows.

One of the things that we’re seeing in Vietnam is more attention from other countries outside the region to come here, in part because of the changing geopolitics that we’re seeing. So in Vietnam, from April 3rd to April 6th, we’re going to see the visit of Burundi’s president. I’m just curious, if you were in the room and you were advising the president of Burundi—who, like a lot of African countries, has engagements with China—he would say to Vietnam’s General Secretary, To Lam, “Listen, your country has been a border with China since the beginning of time. You have more experience dealing with the Chinese than pretty much anybody else on the planet, given the history between China and Vietnam.”

What would you advise, speaking now through the president of Burundi? What would you advise us on how to deal with the Chinese? And as a Vietnam scholar, how would you advise other countries on how to manage ties with the Chinese based on the Vietnamese experience?

I mean, I am not a Burundi official. I have… No, no, not at all. But I just want you to try and channel your thoughts as if you were a counselor to the president.

I would say that from the viewpoint of simply an international relations scholar, if I were ever in the official position, I would say that maybe let’s go to Vietnam because Vietnam and China are trying to expand their foothold in Africa. Maybe we can get a deal by negotiating with two parties at the same time. Maybe we can join hands with the Vietnamese Viettel to see what kind of deal we can negotiate with the Vietnamese government.

I think from the African perspective, the idea here is to get the best deal as you can because the Chinese cannot threaten African country sovereignty. They cannot invade Africa. They can maybe trap these African countries into debt. Maybe the hypothetical scenario is not even real. But I would say that if I were an African country, then I would go shopping in many other countries to see what kind of deal I can get to increase my leverage with the Chinese.

But from the Vietnamese side, if I were to look at Africa, I see a place where a lot of Vietnamese companies can invest and benefit from. Especially as they are really low risk. I mean, if Vietnam invests in countries that are not on good terms with China, then that poses a lot of security problems because the Chinese are going to hate it. But if I invest in Africa, like the security problem is neutral from the Vietnamese perspective. So it’s safer.

Also, African countries need a lot more help compared to, let’s say, other countries like Laos and Cambodia. The Vietnamese have made a lot of deals there. I cannot say for sure because I am not an expert on Vietnam and Africa.

Fair enough. But you know that Vietnam is a major food producer, and Africa is a net importer of food. So there are some trade opportunities that are there. Obviously, technology. In many respects, from a development story, Vietnam has been able to build an industrial capacity as an agrarian developing country, which I think a lot of African countries can look to as a model of development as well.

The article is “What Southeast Asian Countries Can Learn from Vietnam’s History of Negotiating Territorial Disputes with China.” It was written by Kang Vu, who’s a visiting scholar in the political science department at Boston College, and was kind enough to join us on a very chilly third winter morning to tell us more about the article and to share his insights on the different dynamics going on out here in Asia.

Kang, thank you so much for your time today. It was great to catch up with you. Thanks, Eriksen, Kobus, and the audience for listening to the podcast. Kobus, not a lot of parallels, I think, of what’s happening in Vietnam and the Philippines that can apply to, say, Latin America or Africa. Because I think what Kang’s main point was, geography is destiny here.

Even here in Asia, the way that China engages with India is different because of the Himalayas. The way that it deals with the Philippines is different because of the South China Sea than what it does with a land border country that is right there, like Vietnam, which has a flat border in terms of being able to access it.

Nonetheless, I think there are lessons here for what a lot of countries can take away. I just think that the way that Kenya and other countries have approached the great power dynamic is that it doesn’t pay to choose a side, period. The more that it can do that.

Now, South Africa has said they don’t want to choose a side. But according to the United States, they’ve chosen sides. Pretty much every other country says we don’t want to be a part of this. When they look at what’s going on with the Philippines, they say, you know what? That is exhibit A of why we don’t want to choose a side.

Just about South Africa, you know, as a South African, I guess I can say something about that. I think that phrasing, that kind of characterization of the relationship from the U.S. side—that South Africa has essentially chosen a side—I think it just shows that they know nothing about South Africa. They think you’ve chosen the side of Hamas, is what they will say.

Well, the thing is, if they know anything about South African culture, they know that the side South Africa is traditionally on is the U.S. side. The U.S. has had a larger shaping influence on South Africa in good ways and in complicated ways than any other country, and with possible exception of the United Kingdom. I think South Africa, in many ways, still remains very close to the United States, even though it now feels pushed away by the United States.

I think that’s a South African take on it. But, yeah, you know, kind of like even in that case, one of the things that South Africa has been very aware of is that there’s no option but to diversify. You have to choose more and more partners because you never know what could happen to the ones that you think of as familiar. They may have a turn.

That is happening at a speed that is absolutely remarkable and in ways we did not think would happen. I mean, unicorns are starting to fly. When Japan, South Korea, and China have now agreed to start working more closely on trade. For a lot of people who may not follow Northeast Asian politics very closely, this is not something that I think would have happened in the Biden era or if Trump was not president.

But necessity is now forcing countries to come together in ways that I don’t think we would have seen a long time ago. We’re seeing more delegations coming from Brazil. President Lula was in Vietnam, was in Japan with a massive delegation. I think the urgency of these types of junkets from presidents with two, three hundred business leaders in tow has taken on a totally different meaning now in an era when the United States is enacting very large tariff barriers on its market.

They have to find some alternatives and reduce their reliance. This is, in one sense, a very scary period of history. But on the other hand, I’m very excited by what I see because we’re seeing a dramatic reconfiguration of the geopolitical landscape that we’ve seen in at least 40 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, if not since the post-war era in 1945.

As an observer of all of this, it’s fascinating, albeit very scary. Yeah, it’s a little bit like watching those internet videos of tsunamis and earthquakes. You know, it’s amazing to watch, but it’s also a little bit troubling. But in those videos, you know how it ends. I mean, we don’t know how this is going to end.

It’s very big changes. One of the things that is interesting to see is how a lot of structural hegemonies in the U.S.—that the U.S. used to enjoy—not only the dollar version, which is the most, maybe the most extreme or the most well-known version, but also smaller things, like USAID, just simply as a setup infrastructure network of influence projection.

All of that, if you just even left it alone, would have fallen apart slowly over time. But now that it’s being actively dismantled, it’s like this weird, massive experiment in what U.S. influence actually is. You know, what the U.S.’s relationship with the rest of the world is, is being put into this huge lab. Now we’re seeing all these different kinds of things that would have been crazy counterfactuals, literally a year ago, suddenly becoming normal talking points.

We don’t know how this is going to turn out. The part that is a disconnect for me is that President Trump’s supporters, the MAGA wing of U.S. culture, really loves American hegemonic power. I mean, they really love this idea that America is the leader of the free world. They like the norm-setting.

You hear President Trump talk repeatedly about the preeminence of the dollar. They want to be the supreme military commander. They want to be in charge of so much of the international order. But now that they’re withdrawing from so many institutions, there’s even discussions coming through the Wall Street Journal about ending U.S. participation in the United Nations.

So how do you maintain hegemonic privilege and power without participating in the institutions that buttress that power? I think in their mind, it’s well, we’ve got the most powerful military in the world. That may be enough. We will see. What’s happening right now in Myanmar is a very interesting test to see whether that hegemonic power can withstand without presence in the soft power arenas.

I don’t know how this turns out, but I think there’s a fundamental contradiction there between maintaining supreme hegemonic power and without participating in the institutions. That may be difficult for them. I don’t know. No one knows. But I have a feeling that might be a problem.

Yeah, I think so. I think so. And also, you know, those networks were not, in some ways they were closer to something like logistics networks. In some ways, they are an interesting mirroring of the fact that one of the U.S.’s strongest suits is its services. That ended up being another field of excellence for U.S. service provision was aid.

So it had this kind of massive infrastructure, particularly human infrastructure, with all of these networks of highly skilled professionals in the field. Now that all of that is gone, it’s a little bit like FedEx removing all of its regional stations and then still somehow expecting to dominate the field. The people aren’t on the ground anymore.

We have indications that even American corporate power, which is not always aligned with American political power, is also struggling to keep up now in terms of its hegemony. There’s a very interesting contrast between the stock performance and the financial performance between Tesla, one of America’s shining beacons of innovation, and BYD. BYD is registering record earnings, and its stock price is soaring up. Tesla’s going the other way, in part because of Elon Musk’s affiliation with the White House.

We’ve seen, again, Xi’an and Timu outmaneuvering Amazon in global e-commerce, Alibaba doing the same, and companies like Alibaba, Tencent, and DeepSeek rivaling, if not surpassing, the United States in AI development. Right now, it appears that China has at least parity or a lead over the United States across all the key industries of the 21st century. The United States is currently in the process of dismantling its amazing research infrastructure that had funneled billions of dollars to power the innovation that got it to where it is today.

The Internet was created by public money. The Internet would not be created today under the Trump administration because they don’t believe philosophically that it’s the role of government to perform. We’re in a giant experiment right now to see how power is maintained and whether American corporate power is able to survive without the subsidies that went to universities, that funded research, that generated innovations that then generated products for companies like FedEx—GPS being one of them, for example.

It’s an amazing time to be alive, Kobus. I’ll tell you that right now. We’re going to see what happens here. For a lot of Americans who are listening to this, who are unaware of the pace of innovation in China, I would take some time to look at the Wall Street Journal and see what’s happening because the Chinese are advancing in automobiles.

By the way, I have to mention our newsletter because this is one of the things we’ve really been obsessed about. Just today, it’s been announced that they’ve given the full licensing rollout for not only unmanned taxis, like driverless taxis, but also driverless flying taxis in China.

That’s just one of the remarkable things. There was even more notable research that came out regarding the flow of Chinese solar panels into the global south. It’s amazing because it proves the point we’ve been making—that as all these tariffs are increasing in the global north, it’s increasing the flow of these technologies into the global south.

So, the flow of solar panels from China into the global south increased by about 36% last year. Interestingly, even with that increase, it didn’t keep pace with the installation of solar around the world. So what that means is that there are domestic solar industries being sparked, partly by some Chinese investments, some Chinese technology transfers, and some competition among these countries.

In all of this development, the U.S. is nowhere to be seen. The U.S. used to be a solar innovator. Now it has, to a certain extent, removed itself from that space. Not fully. I mean, California is still on the table, but it’s a much diminished position than it used to be, and now it’s being taken over by the rest of the world and China, not only China.

Yes, Americans invented many technologies—5G was invented with Lucent technology, and EV battery chemistry was invented by Americans. In many ways, the foundational research was done in the United States while the Chinese acquired it through various means. And that brings us to where we are today.

I’ll just leave with one point. I live here in Southeast Asia, and in six months, I’ve gone from seeing no Chinese cars to seeing them all over the place. There are three in my building alone. It is remarkable how fast they’re coming. South Africa is experiencing something similar. I remember being in China in 2014 and seeing those little three-wheeler electric trucks being used for transporting fridges—those little micro trucks. I thought, wow, this is exactly what global south countries would like to have.

I saw one on a street in Cape Town yesterday. They’re here. And by the way, you’ve got Chinese EV buses in Cape Town now, you’ve got Chinese cars in Cape Town, and you’ve got Chinese scooters in Cape Town. That whole electrified mobility chain is on display right in your town in Cape Town.

Food delivery is now being done mostly via Chinese-made electric bikes in Cape Town. Well, Kobus, I am so glad that we’re shamelessly promoting our newsletter, which is exactly what we need to do. The work that Kobus and the team does is phenomenal. By the way, we’ve just brought on a new Transitions Minerals editor, Obert Bore, who is fantastic. He’s going to be contributing to us from Southern Africa, focusing on global transition resources, critical resources trends, and supply chains.

This is the kind of work that you get at the China Global South Project from Kobus, from Johnny, from Edwin in Southeast Asia, from myself as well, and Lucy in Taiwan. We truly have a global team now that’s producing some of the most insightful research analysis, data visualizations, and multimedia content. Our colleague in Jenga Hakkina out of Nairobi has a new podcast looking at Chinese EV technology in Africa.

Nobody is covering Chinese engagement the way we are. Again, as you know from listening to this podcast, we’re not approaching this with any agenda. We don’t have partisanship. Sometimes it may sound like we focus on the negative aspects of the U.S. Fair enough, but that’s not an agenda; it’s just sometimes hard not to see it.

This is the kind of work we’re doing. Go to ChinaGlobalSouth.com/subscribe to sign up for a free 30-day trial. If you don’t like it, you don’t have to pay for it. Just give it a try for 30 days. And by the way, if you are a student or a teacher, email me at Eric at ChinaGlobalSouth.com, and I will send you links for half off. Just send me your school email address, whether you’re a high school student, college student, or PhD student.

We have a growing community of students who are really enjoying the work that we’re doing. Once again, that’s ChinaGlobalSouth.com/subscribe. That’ll do it for this edition of the China Global South podcast. Kobus and I will be back again next week with another episode. Until then, for Kobus van Staden in Cape Town, I’m Eric Olander. Thank you so much for listening.

The discussion continues online. Follow the China Global South project on Blue Sky and X at ChinaGS Project or on YouTube at China Global South. Share your thoughts on today’s show or head over to our website at ChinaGlobalSouth.com, where you can subscribe to receive full access to more than 5,000 articles and podcasts. Once again, that’s ChinaGlobalSouth.com. We’ll see you next week. Bye.

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Eric: Hello and welcome to another edition of the China Global South podcast, a proud member of the Seneca Podcast Network. I’m Eric Olander, and as always, I’m joined by CGSP’s Managing Editor, Kobus van Staden, who is with us from beautiful Cape Town, South Africa. A very good afternoon to you, Kobus.

Kobus: Good afternoon, Eric.

Eric: We are recording this in the aftermath of a tragic event that occurred in Southeast Asia last week. A powerful 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck Mandalay in Myanmar, and its impact was felt across the entire region, reaching as far as Ho Chi Minh City, Bangkok, and even Yunnan province in China. As of now, there are at least 1,700 confirmed deaths in Myanmar, a number that is tragically likely to rise. This part of the world is not used to experiencing such massive earthquakes, which are more common in places like Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia.

Kobus: Absolutely, Eric. I’ve lived in Southeast Asia for nearly 15 years, and I’ve never witnessed such a significant quake on the Southeast Asian mainland.

Eric: What’s particularly noteworthy, Kobus, is that I mentioned this in our Monday edition for subscribers: this is the first major international humanitarian disaster since the Trump administration curtailed USAID operations. Under normal circumstances, in response to large humanitarian crises, the United States government, typically through USAID, is very prominent on the ground, responding with speed and capacity that few countries can match.

Kobus: Yes, that’s a significant shift.

Eric: However, that’s not the case this time. The United States has been noticeably absent from the relief efforts in Myanmar, but do you know who is present? The Chinese. They’ve responded quickly with substantial aid. Two Chinese Y-20 cargo planes, akin to the U.S. C-130, arrived with rescue dogs, personnel, and $14 million worth of aid. Air China cargo planes have been consistently sending assistance into Myanmar. Teams have been dispatched from areas like Hong Kong and Yunnan province, and at least 200 Chinese personnel are actively involved. There’s been a showcase of advanced Chinese technology, and state media has been promoting the message: “We are here, and they are not.”

Kobus: What do you think of the geopolitical implications of this humanitarian disaster?

Eric: I think the messaging is pretty clear. They’re presenting it as a South-South solidarity effort. It’s also important to note that the U.S. did announce the allocation of $2 million in aid, but they specified it would go through non-affiliated human rights organizations on the ground in Myanmar. Given Myanmar’s highly autocratic government amidst a civil war, it’s unclear who those organizations really are.

Kobus: That complicates things.

Eric: Additionally, the U.S. mentioned sending a small rescue team, but that team hasn’t been able to enter the country yet, leaving questions about their location and arrival time. They’ve already missed the critical 72-hour rescue window. Overall, I think China is significantly leveraging this situation for propaganda. Their spokespeople have been sharing montages of Chinese and Myanmar workers collaborating in rescue operations.

Kobus: Exactly, while we should also acknowledge that China is not the only responder in the region. Countries such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, and India sent teams as well, with India being among the first.

Eric: True. This situation aligns with a long-standing narrative from China about “Asia for Asians.” We’ve heard similar rhetoric in Africa, where China promotes a message of supporting Africans for their own development, essentially advocating for a region free from Western influence, particularly that of the U.S.

Kobus: That’s a good point. The developments in Myanmar certainly reflect that narrative. Now, shifting gears to the broader geopolitical landscape, particularly in Southeast Asia, we see a lot of action amid great power competition. Recently, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth visited both the Philippines and Japan.

Eric: Yes, and interestingly, he delivered a different message in these regions compared to his comments to European allies. In Europe, he and U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance adopted an aggressive tone, whereas in Asia, he spoke about a partnership that he described as “ironclad” with the Philippines. This brings into focus how countries engaged in territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea are responding differently.

Kobus: The Philippines is clearly leaning into foreign alliances, not just with the U.S., but also with countries like France, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. It’s a growing list of security partnerships.

Eric: Vietnam, similarly engaged in long-standing territorial disputes, offers a compelling contrast to the Philippines. There was a fascinating article in The Diplomat discussing what Southeast Asian nations can learn from Vietnam’s history with China. The author, Kang Vu, is a visiting scholar at Boston College and an old friend of the show. We’re welcoming him back from a chilly Boston this morning. Good morning, Kang.

Kang: Good morning, Eric and Kobus. Yes, we’re in the midst of our third winter here!

Eric: Third winter? That sounds rough.

Kang: It really is! A few weeks ago, it was in the 80s, and now we’re back to the 30s and 40s. The “third winter” is when spring seems to arrive but then you suddenly get hit with a snowstorm. It’s quite demoralizing.

Eric: Let’s dive into the fascinating article you wrote. You provide unique insights as an expert on Vietnam and the different strategies countries are employing in their responses to China. You wrote that Vietnam’s experience suggests that involving extra-regional powers in territorial disputes with China tends to harden China’s stance. Can you elaborate on that?

Kang: Absolutely. The inspiration for this article came from observing how Southeast Asian countries reacted to the U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific. As you noted, Secretary Hegseth’s recent visit to the Philippines revealed a different approach compared to previous administrations. It seems clear that the U.S. is serious about pivoting to the Asia-Pacific now.

Eric: Interesting.

Kang: Yes, and when examining other Southeast Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia, I noticed a shift. Many are expressing the desire for greater independence in their defense strategies rather than completely relying on the U.S. This is intriguing, considering these nations were expected to collaborate with the U.S. to balance against China. Now, they appear to be more cautious.

Kobus: That’s a perplexing situation.

Kang: It leads me to the contrasting behaviors of Vietnam and the Philippines regarding the South China Sea disputes. Vietnam has been actively expanding its territorial claims over various islands, with recent reports indicating that they control around three-fourths of the South China Sea territory compared to China.

Eric: That’s a noteworthy statistic.

Kang: Yes, and in contrast, when the Philippines attempted to resupply its outposts in the sea, China reacted with aggression. The Philippines isn’t militarizing its islands or seeking to expand its territory, yet China has been very confrontational toward them.

Kobus: So how does China’s response differ regarding Vietnam?

Kang: Interestingly, China has remained relatively quiet on Vietnamese activities. While they did conduct military exercises in the Gulf of Tonkin and made some official statements, they haven’t acted aggressively toward Vietnam in the same way they have with the Philippines. This disparity raises questions about China’s strategic calculus.

Eric: That sounds significant.

Kang: Exactly. It suggests differing treatment of nations based on their alliances. History provides insight here: during the third Indochina war, Vietnam relied on the Soviet Union to support its claims against China. But that alliance backfired. China’s anger at Vietnam’s reliance on the Soviets led to military incursions, highlighting how Beijing reacted aggressively to perceived foreign involvement.

Kobus: That paints an interesting historical parallel.

Kang: Yes, and after Vietnam distanced itself from the Soviets, China normalized relations, effectively decoupling their territorial disputes from the broader context of their diplomatic relationship. They adopted a compromise strategy, resolving territorial disputes on more equal terms.

Eric: So, what does this history signify for current Southeast Asian states?

Kang: You could argue that while the Philippines seeks to involve the U.S. in negotiations with China, this strategy might backfire, as it risks provoking China to be even less accommodating, similar to what happened with Vietnam in the past.

Kobus: So, the fear is that involving a foreign power in negotiations could lead to more aggression from China toward the Philippines?

Kang: Exactly. The strategy should perhaps reflect an understanding of the balance of power in the region. Vietnam managed to split territorial claims fairly evenly with China in the past, while the Philippines could risk coercion by relying on U.S. support against a far more powerful China.

Eric: It seems the Philippines’ geographical and political situation creates a dilemma.

Kang: Absolutely. Looking at the current geopolitical landscape, Vietnam’s challenges arise from its land border with China, enabling direct coercion. In comparison, the Philippines has a buffer of ocean, which changes the dynamics of coercion in their relationship with China.

Kobus: That’s a crucial distinction.

Eric: Kang, you mentioned that Vietnam often depends on China for essential resources like electricity and trade, which adds another layer of vulnerability.

Kang: Precisely. When negotiating in the 1990s, Vietnam had little leverage against China. They lost their major ally, the Soviet Union, and faced the risk of further aggression or invasion from China. Yet, remarkably, China agreed to a compromise, splitting territorial claims to secure a more stable long-term relationship.

Kobus: So, the Philippines has more negotiating power now than Vietnam did then?

Kang: Yes, that’s a critical point. The Philippines has more options today, as the Chinese cannot easily coerce the nation regarding its survival. While losing some maritime territory is a concern, a direct invasion is unlikely.

Eric: Your insights offer significant food for thought regarding the future positions of Southeast Asian nations vis-à-vis China and their alliances. Kang: At least the Philippines have more options now. But back in the 1990s, Vietnam had no options. It was either align with the Chinese or not; that was the extent of their choices.

Eric: Is that what you would recommend to Philippine policymakers today? Are they misplaying their hand? Would it be wiser for them to negotiate a settlement with the Chinese rather than face them militarily?

Kang: I would suggest that if the Philippines can strike a deal with the Chinese, in exchange for U.S. military involvement, the Chinese would likely agree to a 50-50% split similar to what occurred with the Vietnamese in the 1990s. I believe that would be a better deal compared to what the Philippines can expect right now. Currently, they’re getting zero. The Americans aren’t willing to defend the Philippines effectively, and the Chinese are applying pressure regardless. The U.S. assures they will help, but we’re left wondering if that’s true.

Kobus: That’s an interesting perspective.

Kang: If we look at historical examples, consider how Vietnam and the Soviet Union were close allies in the 1970s. When China invaded Vietnamese territory in 1979, the Soviet Union did nothing. They effectively told Vietnam to handle the situation alone. The Soviet reality during the 1988 occupation of the Johnson South Reef was similar; the Soviet Navy was present but took no action. I wouldn’t expect the United States to act any differently.

Eric: That seems like a significant parallel.

Kang: Indeed, especially since the Soviet Union was China’s neighbor, with a long land border that could facilitate invasions. The cost of action was so high that even the Soviets opted not to get involved. The U.S., being across the Pacific Ocean from the Philippines, would face minimal consequences for not fulfilling its commitments. Losing an ally like the Philippines wouldn’t threaten U.S. security in any substantial way; after all, the Philippines isn’t South Korea or Japan.

Kobus: You make a valid point.

Kang: I think we should be cautious about assuming U.S. guarantees to defend the Philippines. There’s been talk of security cooperation between Vietnam and Indonesia. If I recall correctly, they’ve discussed territorial and maritime issues.

Eric: So, how does China perceive these middle powers in its neighborhood forming independent connections? For example, this week, Vietnam announced purchases of weapons from South Korea. In the context of these regional interactions, how does Beijing react?

Kang: From a Chinese perspective, they’d likely assess the net gain in Vietnam’s relations with surrounding countries. If Vietnam aligns with Indonesia to counterbalance against China, I would see that as a laughable endeavor. Indonesia is relatively weak. Historically, even with a Soviet alliance, Vietnam couldn’t effectively balance against China, so how can Vietnam and Indonesia together pose a challenge?

Kobus: It raises interesting questions.

Kang: Yes, particularly considering that Vietnam has negotiated maritime disputes on the southern edge of the South China Sea without directly challenging Chinese interests.

Eric: Let’s discuss Vietnam’s military acquisitions. Vietnam can purchase weapons from South Korea, Russia, or any other major power, but will that significantly alter the military balance with China?

Kang: Not really. Even during its alliance with the Soviet Union, which positioned 44 military divisions along the Sino-Soviet border, Vietnam was still vulnerable. The Chinese were not deterred from launching an invasion. Today, China’s military strength far surpasses what it was back then.

Kobus: That makes sense.

Kang: Let’s play devil’s advocate. You assert that if neighboring Asian countries align with external powers, China will respond negatively. However, look at India—it’s part of the U.S.-led Quad initiative, yet after years of strained relations, there’s now a détente occurring. Ambassadors are back in each other’s capitals, and border tensions are easing, despite Modi and Trump’s personal rapport. How does this fit into your argument?

Kang: India is a unique case. The Himalayas create a geographical barrier between China and India, making large-scale conflicts more difficult. In contrast, the Vietnam-China land border is largely flat, which has historically made Vietnam more vulnerable to invasion.

Kobus: That’s a crucial distinction.

Kang: Small military skirmishes between China and India have occurred, but they tend to be limited in scale. China understands the security the Himalayas provide. In Central Asia, smaller former Soviet states pose no significant threat to China. Just look at the friendly ties between China and Russia today.

Eric: So, does this mean that because of its geography, China sees Vietnam as particularly vulnerable?

Kang: Exactly. Vietnam is one of China’s key vulnerabilities due to its porous border and historical invasions. It’s critical to be aware of these dynamics.

Kobus: Returning to Southeast Asia, you mentioned increased concerns regarding U.S. involvement.

Kang: There’s certainly overlap with Europe. After the Munich Security Conference, we saw a flurry of European officials expressing dissatisfaction, followed by discussions about enhancing their own military capabilities.

Eric: Do you foresee a similar process in Southeast Asia?

Kang: It’s unlikely, as these countries alone lack the power to counterbalance China without the U.S. The U.S. has dominated maritime security in the Indo-Pacific since World War II, and its absence would leave these nations vulnerable.

Kobus: I completely agree.

Kang: Moreover, there’s a lack of political institutions in the region to foster cooperation. ASEAN is the closest entity but operates as a weak institution by design. Japan and South Korea are deeply intertwined with U.S. defense systems, making withdrawal disruptive for them.

Eric: Are these countries looking for alternative arrangements to work with China rather than against it?

Kang: I don’t see much indication of that happening. The NATO model works in Europe because those countries share common interests, but Southeast Asia’s historical animosities hinder such cooperation.

Kobus: However, could there be a new approach emerging, perhaps in discussions about securing some form of regional decision-making structure?

Kang: I don’t detect any signs of that yet. Past attempts like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization failed due to internal divisions. Meanwhile, ASEAN has fallen far short of its goals regarding collective security.

Eric: That’s an insightful observation.

Kang: Countries like Thailand, which was once a U.S. treaty ally, quickly normalized relations with China after the Vietnam War, showing that regional priorities can overshadow alliances.

Kobus: The current leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia seem aligned with China rather than the U.S.

Kang: Yes, and that illustrates the challenge of forming a united front against China. Even among Southeast Asian powers, there’s significant reluctance to oppose Chinese influence.

Eric: It’s a complex landscape, indeed.

Kang: Those bigger powers might express some rhetoric about unity, but the reality is that the political will and concrete actions often don’t align with such statements.

Kobus: It seems we are far from seeing a cohesive strategy emerge in the region.

Kang: Exactly. The reluctance underlines regional complexities and historical grievances that complicate cooperation against China. Eric: What would you advise, speaking now through the president of Burundi? How should we deal with the Chinese? And as a Vietnam scholar, how would you counsel other countries to manage ties with China based on Vietnam’s experience?

Kang: Well, I’m not a Burundi official. Not at all. But I want you to think about it as if you were a counselor to the president.

Kang: I would suggest, from the perspective of an international relations scholar, that we could look at Vietnam. Both Vietnam and China are trying to expand their foothold in Africa. Perhaps we could negotiate a deal by engaging with both parties simultaneously. Joining forces with Vietnamese companies like Viettel could lead to beneficial agreements.

Kang: From the African perspective, the aim should be to secure the best possible deal. The Chinese cannot threaten the sovereignty of African countries or invade them, although they might entrap them in debt. That said, I’d recommend African nations explore multiple options to negotiate leverage against the Chinese.

Kang: On the other hand, if I were looking at Africa from a Vietnamese angle, I’d see plenty of opportunities for investment. African countries present low-risk options for investment. If Vietnam invests in countries that are antagonistic towards China, that could lead to security challenges. But investing in Africa is comparatively safer since the security issues are neutral from Vietnam’s perspective.

Kang: African nations also need significantly more assistance than countries like Laos and Cambodia, where Vietnam has formed extensive partnerships. I can’t claim expertise in the Vietnam-Africa relationship, but that’s my perception.

Eric: Fair enough. But we know that Vietnam is a major food producer, and Africa is a net importer of food. So, there are evident trade opportunities. Also, from a development standpoint, Vietnam has been able to build industrial capacity as an agrarian developing country, which could serve as a model for many African nations.

Kang: Yes, absolutely. The article titled “What Southeast Asian Countries Can Learn from Vietnam’s History of Negotiating Territorial Disputes with China” was written by me, Kang Vu. I’m a visiting scholar in the political science department at Boston College. I’m glad to be here, especially on this chilly winter morning, to share insights about the article and the dynamics affecting Asia.

Eric: Thank you very much for your time today, Kang. It’s wonderful to reconnect. Thanks to Kobus and the audience for tuning into the podcast. Kobus, I believe there are not many parallels between the situations in Vietnam and the Philippines that could apply to regions like Latin America or Africa. I think Kang’s main point is that geography heavily influences these dynamics.

Kobus: Indeed, even within Asia, the way China interacts with India differs due to the Himalayas. Its approach to the Philippines is also distinct because of the South China Sea, particularly compared to its relationship with a land-bordering nation like Vietnam.

Eric: Nonetheless, I think there are broader lessons to be learned. Countries like Kenya and others approach the great power contest carefully, favoring neutrality.

Kobus: Right, South Africa has stated that it does not wish to choose sides. However, the United States perceives it differently, claiming that South Africa has taken a side, which adds to the complexity.

Eric: Regarding South Africa, speaking from my perspective, I think the U.S. views its positioning in a misguided way. They might assert that South Africa has aligned with groups like Hamas, but if they understood South African culture better, they would realize that traditionally, South Africa has leaned towards the U.S.

Kobus: Exactly. South Africa has historically had a larger influence from the U.S. than any other country, apart from possibly the U.K. Despite feeling somewhat sidelined by the U.S. now, South Africa remains close to American interests.

Kang: This reflects the understanding in South Africa: there’s a necessity to diversify partnerships. You can’t rely solely on familiar alliances because circumstances can change rapidly.

Eric: It seems that changes are happening at a remarkable pace. Japan, South Korea, and China are now collaborating more closely on trade—a shift we didn’t anticipate during the Biden era or while Trump was in office.

Kang: Absolutely. Necessity is driving countries to unite in ways that seemed unlikely not long ago. For instance, Brazil’s President Lula visited Vietnam and Japan with a large delegation, driving significant discussions on trade.

Kobus: It’s a pivotal time in history with a dramatic reconfiguration of the geopolitical landscape, which we haven’t seen since the Berlin Wall fell or possibly even since the post-war era of 1945.

Eric: Observing these transitions is intriguing, albeit a bit unsettling. It’s reminiscent of those internet videos showcasing tsunamis and earthquakes—fascinating but troubling. While those videos have predictable outcomes, we don’t yet know the ending of this situation.

Kang: Indeed, profound changes are underway. One interesting observation is how structural hegemonies that the U.S. used to hold, like the dominance of the dollar and its extensive influence networks through aid, are being actively dismantled.

Kobus: True enough. Even without intervention, these structures would have deteriorated over time, but now we’re witnessing a rapid alteration of American influence on the global stage.

Eric: The contradiction lies within President Trump’s supporters, who cherish America’s hegemonic power. They seem to want to retain global leadership in various spheres, yet discussions about withdrawing from key institutions like the United Nations arise.

Kang: Exactly! It’s challenging to maintain hegemonic privilege while stepping back from the very institutions that sustain that power. While they may argue that military might is sufficient, we’ll have to see if that works out.

Eric: Certainly, that contradiction presents a fundamental challenge moving forward.

Kang: Moreover, U.S. aid networks can be seen as logistical support systems, which have historically mirrored America’s strength in services. However, with these networks dismantled, it’s akin to a logistics company removing all its regional offices but still expecting to dominate.

Kobus: Very true. There’s also a disconnect between American corporate interests and political power. We’re seeing contrasts between companies like Tesla, facing struggles, and BYD, which is thriving.

Kang: Yes, companies like BYD and Alibaba are effectively challenging American companies in critical industries of the 21st century, suggesting that China may have an edge in tech development.

Eric: The U.S. is actively dismantling its research infrastructure that had once powered significant innovations. For example, the internet was born from public investment, a model that current administration philosophies seem opposed to.

Kang: We’re in a fascinating, albeit precarious, phase of global power dynamics. Observing how American corporate power holds up without its usual support mechanisms will be enlightening.

Eric: In the span of just six months living in Southeast Asia, I’ve gone from seeing no Chinese cars to spotting them everywhere.

Kang: The same trend is happening in South Africa, with visible Chinese products like electric vehicles. Just yesterday, I saw one of those small electric trucks on the streets of Cape Town.

Kobus: Absolutely! From food delivery to public transport, the presence of Chinese-made products is quite noticeable now.

Eric: Speaking of which, let’s take a moment to promote our newsletter, which covers these evolving dynamics. We’ve added a new editor, Obert Bore, who focuses on critical resources and supply chains from Southern Africa.

Kang: Indeed, our global team is producing incisive research on these matters, covering Chinese engagement comprehensively.

Eric: Our approach is devoid of partisanship. If you want to stay updated on these shifts, head to ChinaGlobalSouth.com/subscribe to try a free 30-day trial. Students, feel free to email me for special discounts.

Kang: We’re building an engaged community around this work, part of a broader effort to understand these complex international relations.

Eric: Thank you for listening to this episode of the China Global South podcast. Kobus and I will be back next week with another discussion. Until then, from Kobus van Staden in Cape Town, I’m Eric Olander. Thank you for joining us. Eric: The discussion continues online. You can follow the China Global South project on Blue Sky and X at ChinaGS Project, or check us out on YouTube at China Global South.

Eric: We’d love to hear your thoughts on today’s show. You can share your feedback or visit our website at ChinaGlobalSouth.com. There, you can subscribe for full access to more than 5,000 articles and podcasts.

Eric: Once again, that’s ChinaGlobalSouth.com. We’ll see you next week. Bye!